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WHEN IS TWO A CROWD? 
THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL ACTION ON 
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 
Jonathan H. Adler∗ 
Introduction 
Up until the 1970s, environmental protection largely consisted of a 
patchwork of state laws, local ordinances and common law nuisance pro-
tections.1 By the late 1960s, state and local governments had adopted vari-
ous environmental measures. Nonetheless, there was a general perception 
that they were unable or unwilling to address most environmental concerns.2 
Congress responded with an array of environmental statutes that reori-
ented the federal-state relationship in environmental law.3 The federal gov-
ernment assumed the dominant role in national policy-making. States 
continue their environmental protection efforts, but they are largely over-
shadowed by the federal government.4 
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1
 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contempo-
rary Models, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1147 (1995).  
2
 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental Regulation: 
Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 93 
(2004).  
3
 These statutes include the Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970), 
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 
898 (later amended as the Clean Water Act and codiªed at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2000)), the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 
Stat. 973 (1972), the Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973), the 
Safe Drinking Water Act, Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974), the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976), and the Toxic Sub-
stances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, 90 Stat. 2003 (1976). The National Environ-
mental Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969), was also an important envi-
ronmental statute, but it did not have as much of an impact on the federal-state balance in 
environmental law. See Percival, supra note 1, at 1159. 
4
 See John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: Lessons 
from Environmental Regulation, 60 Law & Contemp. Probs. 203, 205 (1997) (“[The role 
of states] is increasingly restricted to those areas not yet subject to extensive federal regu-
lation . . . and to the implementation and enforcement of permits issued pursuant to federal 
standards and procedures.”). 
68 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 31 
In recent years scholars have begun to reexamine the federal-state 
balance in environmental law.5 New scholarship has challenged the necessity 
and effectiveness of much federal environmental regulation, while others 
have defended the preeminent role of federal environmental law. There 
remains substantial disagreement on the extent to which states can be trusted 
to adopt welfare-enhancing environmental safeguards.6 Some scholars fear 
that states would adopt suboptimal levels of environmental protections 
absent a sufªcient federal regulatory “ºoor.”7 This concern exists even 
where environmental problems lack the sort of extraterritorial impacts 
that are likely to produce insufªcient environmental protection at the state 
and local level.8 
Despite the extensive scholarly literature assessing the proper role of 
federalism in environmental law, there has been relatively little analysis 
 
                                                                                                                             
5
 See, e.g., Henry Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, Using Federalism to Improve 
Environmental Policy (1996); Daniel A. Farber, Eco-Pragmatism: Making Sensi-
ble Environmental Decisions in an Uncertain World 179–83 (1999); Pietro S. 
Nivola & Jon A. Shields, AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, 
Managing Green Mandates: Local Rigors of U.S. Environmental Regulation 
(2001); David Schoenbrod, Saving Our Environment from Washington (2005); 
Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 570 (1996); 
James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation More Adaptive Through Decentrali-
zation: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1377 (2004); Wallace E. Oates, A 
Reconsideration of Environmental Federalism, in Recent Advances in Environmental 
Economics 1, 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002); Percival, supra note 1; Rich-
ard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response 
to Critics, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 535, 536–37 (1997); Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Inter-
state Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environ-
mental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1210 (1992) [hereinafter Revesz, Rehabilitating]. 
Even analysts that are highly skeptical of the beneªts of granting states greater control 
over environmental policy decisions acknowledge that some measure of decentralization is 
warranted. See, e.g., Esty at 653 (endorsing a “middle road” between centralization and 
decentralization); Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or Re-
form?, 31 Envtl. L. Rep. 11086, 11094 (2001) (calling for “accountable devolution”). 
6
 For critiques of decentralization, see, for example, Kirsten H. Engel, State Environ-
mental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To the Bottom”?, 48 Hastings L.J. 
271 (1996–97); Kirsten Engel & Susan Rose-Ackerman, Environmental Federalism in the 
United States: The Risks of Devolution, in Regulatory Competition and Economic 
Integration: Comparative Perspectives 135 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 
2001); Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 351 
(2000); Peter P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining Failures 
in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 67 
(1996). 
7
 It is important to note that a suboptimal regulatory regime could either over-regulate 
or under-regulate. In some environmental literature, however, there is a greater concern that 
states will under-regulate absent active federal participation in environmental protection. 
8
 For example, some commentators fear that interjurisdictional competition for eco-
nomic investment will produce a “race to the bottom” that leads to systematic underprotec-
tion of environmental values. See, e.g., Clifford Recthschaffen & David L. Markell, 
Reinventing Environmental Enforcement & the State/Federal Relationship 22–
25 (2003) (the race-to-the-bottom theory is “one of the central underpinnings of federal 
environmental regulation” (quoting Esty, supra note 5, at 628)); William A. Fischel, The 
Home Voter Hypothesis 162 (2001) (noting “a widespread belief that competition among 
jurisdictions poses a danger of a mutually-destructive ‘race to the bottom’”); Swire, supra 
note 6; Engel, supra note 6. 
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of why states adopt given environmental policies.9 There is even less con-
sideration of how federal regulatory choices inºuence state environmental 
policy, and how a change in federal policy could inºuence states’ willing-
ness to adopt more environmental protections of their own. This Article 
seeks to address this gap by describing some of the factors that are likely 
to inºuence state environmental policy decisions and delineating how 
federal environmental policies can affect state policy choices. Speciªcally, 
this Article seeks to further the understanding of how federal regulation 
inºuences the scope and effectiveness of state regulations. 
Some of the factors that inºuence state regulatory decisions are readily 
apparent, such as wealth, knowledge and interest-group pressure. The inºu-
ences of federal regulation on state regulatory choices, particularly inso-
far as such inºuences are felt indirectly, may be less obvious. Nonethe-
less, it should be evident that federal policy decisions should have some 
effect on state policy choices concerning the existence, scope and contours 
of state regulatory programs. These effects can occur whether intended or 
not. In some instances, federal action may even preclude or discourage 
welfare-enhancing initiatives at the state and local level. 
This Article suggests a framework for categorizing and analyzing how 
federal policy decisions can inºuence state regulatory choices. The fed-
eral inºuence can be either “positive”—resulting in greater levels of state 
regulation—or “negative.” Federal inºuence can also be direct or indirect. 
Direct inºuences include federal preemption and the creation of various in-
centives and penalties for state action or inaction, including conditional 
preemption and conditional funding. Indirect inºuences may be less ob-
vious, but are no less important. Federal action—or perhaps even federal 
inaction—can encourage greater state regulation by reducing the costs of 
initiating regulatory action or by altering state policy agendas. At the same 
time, federal regulation may discourage states from adopting or maintaining 
more protective environmental rules or even “crowd out” state-level regu-
latory action by reducing the net beneªts of state-level initiatives. 
Building on prior research and analysis of federalism in environ-
mental law and policy,10 this Article further seeks to reexamine some of 
 
                                                                                                                             
9
 See Paul Teske, Regulation in the States 8 (2004) (“[S]tate regulation is far less 
well understood than federal regulation, though it is no less important.”). In this regard, the 
Teske volume is an important addition to the literature. 
10
 See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 
N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 130 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch]; Jonathan H. 
Adler, Judicial Federalism and the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 Iowa 
L. Rev. 377 (2005) [hereinafter Adler, Judicial Federalism]; Adler, supra note 2; Jonathan 
H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur Environmental Innova-
tion, in The Jurisdynamics of Environmental Protection: Change and the Prag-
matic Voice in Environmental Law (Jim Chen ed., 2004); Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks 
Stop Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 205, 226 
(2001); Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce 
Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 Envtl. L. 1 
(1999) [hereinafter Adler, Wetlands]; Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of 
70 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 31 
the conventional assumptions that underpin many discussions of the proper 
federal-state balance in environmental policy. Among other things, this 
Article suggests that insufªcient attention to the effects of federal action 
on state policy choices can reduce the scope and effectiveness of envi-
ronmental protection efforts. For example, if federal regulatory action has 
the potential to discourage or crowd out state regulatory efforts, the adoption 
of a federal regulatory ºoor may actually lower instead of raise the ag-
gregate level of environmental protection in a given jurisdiction.11 
Part I provides a brief overview of the development of environmental 
regulation at the state and local levels and identiªes some of the factors 
that inºuence state-level environmental regulatory decisions. These fac-
tors, which may vary over time, help explain why governments at any level 
choose to adopt environmental regulations and why different states, left 
to their own devices, will adopt different environmental policies. A given 
state that is unlikely to adopt speciªc environmental measures at one point 
may be more likely to adopt the same, or even more extensive, measures 
at a later date due to socio-economic changes. This “environmental transi-
tion” provides the context for understanding how federal regulatory deci-
sions can impact state regulatory decisions over time. Identifying those 
economic and political factors which are likely to inºuence state policy 
choices is also necessary in order to isolate and evaluate the extent to 
which federal policies affect state decisions. 
Part II provides an introductory matrix and brief overview of how 
federal regulatory decisions can directly inºuence state regulatory deci-
sions. This Part explains that federal directives commanding state regula-
tory action are constitutionally prohibited, but federal prohibitions on state 
regulatory action are not. Further, the federal government retains substantial 
power to induce state regulatory action through the provision of various 
penalties and incentives, including the conditional use of preemption and 
the use of conditional funding. 
Part III turns to the indirect effects of federal regulation on state regula-
tory choices. This Part explains how federal regulatory action may in-
crease the amount of state-level environmental regulation, even in the ab-
sence of direct federal incentives. Federal action may alter the policy agenda 
at the state level by highlighting or otherwise increasing public aware-
ness of environmental concerns at the state level. It can also alter the in-
terest group demand for state-level regulation or facilitate the adoption of 
state-level regulation by reducing the costs of enacting or implementing 
 
                                                                                                                             
Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 Geo. 
Mason L. Rev. 573 (1998). 
11
 For articulations of the contrary position, see, for example, Paul S. Weiland, Federal 
and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 Harv. Envtl. L. 
Rev. 237, 242 (2000), arguing that federal “minimum standards may raise the bar by estab-
lishing a baseline of protection” and “foreclose the possibility of a race to the bottom or 
race to laxity,” and Steinzor, supra note 6. 
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state regulatory initiatives. In this sense, federal action can serve as a com-
plement to state regulation. 
Part III also contemplates the potential for federal regulations to 
have the opposite indirect effect. Speciªcally, this Part explains how fed-
eral regulatory action has the potential to discourage more protective state 
rules as well as to crowd out state regulatory efforts insofar as federal regu-
lations serve as a substitute for state-level environmental protections. This 
Part describes those conditions under which federal regulation could re-
sult in less overall environmental regulation in a given state than had the 
federal government never regulated at all. In particular, where the federal 
government creates a regulatory ºoor before the adoption of state-level 
regulation, it becomes less likely that a given state will adopt regulations 
of its own in the future. This can be true even if at a later date, due to a 
state’s own environmental transition, the amount of environmental regu-
lation demanded in a state is greater than that provided by the federal 
government. As a result, the adoption of a federal regulatory ºoor that in-
creases aggregate levels of environmental protection in the short run may, 
in the long run, result in less environmental protection in a given state. 
Insofar as one assumes that increased levels of environmental regulation 
will, on the margin, increase net welfare, non-preemptive federal environ-
mental regulations could still produce net welfare reductions over time.12 
This could be true even if one assumes that a given federal regulation is, 
when viewed in isolation, cost-beneªcial, as well as if one ignores poten-
tial qualitative differences between states and the federal government that 
may produce more optimal regulation at the state level. 
In order to simplify the analysis, the bulk of this Article discusses the 
effects of federal action on state policy choices in quantitative terms, such as 
whether federal action produces more or less of a given type of state 
regulation. Part IV explains how this oversimpliªes the analysis in two 
respects. First, while it is common to suggest that more environmental 
regulation is better than less regulation, it is not always clear that greater 
levels of environmental regulation are always welfare enhancing. The opti-
mal level of environmental regulation in a given context may be greater 
than current levels, but it may also be lower if the costs of a given level 
of regulation exceed the beneªts. Second, environmental regulation can 
vary in both quantitative and qualitative ways, and the latter variations 
among competing environmental policies may be more important to the 
attainment of optimal levels of environmental protection than any quanti-
tative regulatory target. Accounting for qualitative differences in environ-
 
                                                                                                                             
12
 It should be noted that increases in the stringency of environmental regulation will 
not necessarily produce net increases in social welfare. Insofar as the costs of increased 
environmental regulation, economic and otherwise, are greater than the beneªts, increased 
regulation will reduce social welfare. However, insofar as one assumes that existing envi-
ronmental regulations are under-protective, the potential for federal regulations to discour-
age greater protection at the state level should be of some concern. See also infra Part IV. 
72 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 31 
mental policy measures may unduly complicate the analysis, but they should 
not be ignored. 
Demonstrating the theoretical possibility that federal regulation may 
crowd out state-level environmental protection does not establish that such 
crowding out has, or will, occur in any speciªc regulatory context. With 
this caveat in mind, Part V reconsiders the history of environmental pro-
tection at the state and federal level with a particular focus on wetland regu-
lation. The history of state and federal regulation in this area is consistent 
with the crowding-out hypothesis and other aspects of this analysis. It does 
not by itself, however, demonstrate that such crowding out has occurred. 
Rather, it underscores the need for greater attention to the effect federal 
policy decisions have on state policy choices and also suggests the need for 
further empirical examination of this issue.13 
I. The Demand for Environmental Regulation 
The demand for environmental regulation is not static. It changes 
over time due to a number of factors. Historically, the demand for environ-
mental protection in industrial societies has increased alongside the ac-
cumulation of societal wealth and scientiªc knowledge. Wealthier and more 
knowledgeable societies demand greater levels of environmental protec-
tion. Other factors that may vary over time and place inºuence the de-
mand for environmental protection as well. 
Although governmental regulations are not the only means of protect-
ing environmental values,14 public demand for greater levels of environ-
mental protection has led to the enactment of environmental laws. As Pro-
fessor Farber summarized, “the passage of environmental laws is attrib-
utable to strong public demand, coupled with exploitation of that demand 
by ideological and credit-seeking politicians.”15 The relevant question is 
what determines the level of public demand for environmental protection, as 
well as the strength and involvement of other policy actors. Understand-
ing the factors that inºuence the demand for environmental protection is 
necessary to analyze the effect that federal regulations may have on state 
regulatory choices. 
 
                                                                                                                             
13
 Identifying and quantifying the extent of any such crowding out and other indirect 
effects of non-preemptive federal regulation on state regulatory activities in the environ-
mental and other regulatory contexts is a subject for subsequent empirical investigation, 
and lies beyond the scope of this Article. 
14
 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Free & Green: A New Approach to Environmental 
Protection, 24 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 653 (2001); Terry Anderson & Donald Leal, 
Free Market Environmentalism (1991); Fred L. Smith, Jr., Markets and the Environ-
ment: A Critical Reappraisal, 13 Contemp. Econ. Pol’y 62 (1995); Fred L. Smith, Jr., A 
Free-Market Environmental Program, 11 Cato J. 457 (1992). 
15
 Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. Econ. & 
Org. 59, 61 (1992). 
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A. The Environmental Transition 
There was not always a signiªcant demand for environmental regula-
tion. While this nation has a long and proud conservation history, dating 
back at least to the creation of hunting-oriented conservation groups at 
the turn of the twentieth century,16 many of the environmental matters sub-
ject to regulation today were not seen as signiªcant problems. Even as vari-
ous environmental problems began to emerge, they were not initially seen 
as signiªcant policy concerns. Some environmental problems were re-
garded as the inevitable, if not wholly desirable, consequence of indus-
trial progress and economic growth.17 In other cases, society was simply 
unaware of the magnitude of certain environmental harms. In still other 
instances, ofªcial policy sought to encourage environmental modiªcations 
and land-use changes that current policy now seeks to reverse.18 
Furthermore, the state of environmental knowledge was relatively poor. 
Environmental resources were devalued, and some environmental offenses 
were even believed to be positive goods. Wetlands were viewed as breed-
ing grounds for mosquitoes that spread disease; the important ecological 
functions wetlands provide were underappreciated, if even understood at 
all.19 Predators and pest species were targets for extermination, with little 
consideration of the role various species play in ecosystem health.20 For 
example, in the 1950s, government agencies sprayed DDT and other pes-
ticides indiscriminately, even over the objections of local landowners, with 
little cognizance of the potential consequences for non-target species.21 At 
one time, many thought smoke and coal dust had “antiseptic” qualities 
 
                                                                                                                             
16
 See Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental 
Movement 79–80 (rev. ed. 2003). 
17
 See, e.g., William Donahue Ellis, The Cuyahoga 157 (1966) (stating that some 
viewed the prismatic colors of pollution on the Cuyahoga River as “the sweetest colors a 
river ever had”). External factors also affected the level of concern about waste manage-
ment and other environmental practices. See, e.g., Craig E. Colten & Peter N. Skinner, 
The Road to Love Canal: Managing Industrial Waste Before EPA 139–41 (1996) 
(noting that wartime imperatives reduced concern for industrial waste management during 
World War II). 
18
 For examples of how federal policy has encouraged environmental harm, see gener-
ally Government vs. Environment (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002). 
See also Jason Scott Johnston, The Tragedy of Centralization: The Political Economics of 
Natural Resource Federalism, 74 U. Colo. L. Rev. 487, 514 (2003) (“During the Progres-
sive Era . . . most federal laws were not passed to preserve natural resources but to develop 
them.”). 
19
 Paul F. Scodari, Envtl. Law Inst., Measuring the Beneªts of Federal Wet-
land Programs 16–17 (1997); see also David E. Gerard, Federal Flood Policies: 150 
Years of Environmental Mischief, in Government vs. Environment, supra note 18, at 
59–77. 
20
 See J. Bishop Grewell, War on Wildlife, in Government vs. Environment, supra 
note 18, at 97–121. 
21
 See Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, Silent Springs and Silent Villages: Pes-
ticides and the Trampling of Property Rights, in Government vs. Environment, supra 
note 18, at 15–37. 
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and could stem the spread of tuberculosis.22 In the ªrst part of the twenti-
eth century, environmental protection, as it is understood today, was not a 
prominent public concern, particularly in comparison to economic devel-
opment, technological progress and addressing other social ills. Insofar 
as environmental protection registered on the public agenda, it was focused 
on sanitation and drinking water, not recreational or aesthetic values. 
As the nation awakened to environmental concerns, regulations and 
other protective measures were put in place. City by city, state by state, 
the nation began to go through what can be termed an environmental transi-
tion.23 Places that once placed little value on environmental protection now 
sought the adoption of stringent regulatory measures. Increased demand 
for environmental protection led to the adoption of a new generation of 
local, state and, eventually, federal environmental controls. The ªrst regu-
latory measures were local ordinances designed to control smoke—one of 
the ªrst modern environmental problems to be recognized as such.24 Later 
measures addressed other air pollution concerns, water pollution and, 
eventually, other environmental problems.25 
This increase in demand for environmental protection can best be 
understood as resulting from an environmental transition, during which a 
given community or jurisdiction develops a demand for a given type of envi-
ronmental protection. This transition is driven, in large part, by increases 
in economic well-being. As higher-order priorities are addressed, and 
quality of life improves, societies begin to devote more resources to previ-
ously neglected concerns. Once families are housed, clothed and fed, they 
begin to devote greater efforts to securing other wants and necessities, in-
cluding greater protection of their health and environmental surroundings. 
As populations become wealthier, both their willingness and ability 
to pay for environmental protection increase dramatically.26 At the same 
time, increases in development tend to coincide with increases in techno-
logical capabilities and the accumulation of scientiªc and other knowl-
edge which may reveal heretofore unknown aspects of environmental prob-
lems, further heightening the desire for change.27 It is also likely that the 
increase in development itself, insofar as it results in increased pollution 
and other environmental harms, further serves to increase the priority of 
environmental protection. A given level of pollution may be viewed ini-
tially as an acceptable cost to bear in return for increased prosperity. Yet 
 
                                                                                                                             
22
 Indur M. Goklany, Clearing the Air: The Real Story of the War on Air 
Pollution 11 (1999). 
23
 Id. at 5, 87–109. 
24
 See Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 32 J. 
Air Pollution Control Ass’n 44, 44 (1982). 
25
 See Adler, supra note 2, at 98–100; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environ-
mental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 553, 577 (2001). 
26
 Goklany, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he wealthier the society, the more it can afford to 
research, develop, and install the technologies necessary for a cleaner environment.”). 
27
 Id. at 89. 
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over time, as prosperity and pollution both increase, priorities and per-
ceptions change. What was once an “acceptable” level of pollution be-
comes unacceptable. At the same time, increased productive efªciency and 
technical capabilities reduce waste and industrial products. The end re-
sult of these trends is an eventual reduction in pollution levels. This the-
ory of an environmental transition can explain the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve documented in an extensive economic literature, in which pollu-
tion levels initially increase but then eventually decline as societal wealth 
increases over time.28 
For any given environmental problem, the environmental transition 
begins with a “period of perception,” a period “during which a substance 
. . . gains sufªcient notoriety to be perceived as [a] . . . pollutant by the 
public and, perhaps more importantly, by policy-makers.”29 Unless a given 
environmental problem is recognized as such, there is no reason to expect 
any institution, public or private, to do much about it. This period of per-
ception is itself facilitated by both changes in social priorities as well as 
by increases in scientiªc and technical knowledge. Societal afºuence and 
technological capacity are almost certainly interdependent, and they both 
seem to be important elements of the environmental transition.30 In most 
cases, however, the period of perception will precede the adoption of poli-
cies to address a given environmental concern. For many, if not most, envi-
ronmental problems, the period of perception began in states and local 
communities before it occurred at the federal level.31 If for no other rea-
son, this occurred because many environmental problems were evident at 
the local level before they received national attention. As a result, many 
 
                                                                                                                             
28
 See Bruce Yandle, Madhusudan Bhattarai & Maya Vijayaraghavan, Environmental 
Kuznets Curves: A Review of Findings, Methods, and Policy Implications, PERC Research 
Study 02-1 (Apr. 2004); see also Richard L. Stroup, Eco-nomics: What Everyone Should 
Know about Economics and the Environment 13–14 (2003) (summarizing research 
ªnding that willingness to pay for environmental protection increases with income); Jason 
Scott Johnston, On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 Va. Envtl. L.J. 129, 146 (2002) 
(“There is abundant evidence that the demand for outdoor recreation and environmental 
amenities increases with national income.”); Kenneth E. McConnell, Income and the De-
mand for Environmental Quality, 2 Envtl. & Dev. Econ. 383, 385–86 (1997) (reporting 
on empirical evidence of an Environmental Kuznets Curve); Matthew E. Kahn & John G. 
Matsusaka, Demand for Environmental Goods: Evidence from Voting Patterns on Califor-
nia Initiatives, 40 J.L. & Econ. 137 (1997) (noting that for most environmental goods 
demand rises with income); Patrick Low, Trade and the Environment: What Worries the 
Developing Countries?, 23 Envtl. L. 705, 706 (1993) (noting that “the demand for im-
proved environmental quality tends to rise with income”). Not all analysts accept that the 
Environmental Kuznets Curve can be generalized across all societies or applied to all envi-
ronmental problems, or even that it accurately describes observed trends in some developed 
nations. See, e.g., Susmita Dasgupta, et al., Confronting the Environmental Kuznets Curve, 16 
J. Econ. Persp. 147 (2002); David I. Stern, Progress on the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve?, 3 Env’t & Dev. Econ. 173 (1998). 
29
 Goklany, supra note 22, at 3.  
30
 See id. at 89. 
31
 See Adler, supra note 2, at 100. 
76 Harvard Environmental Law Review [Vol. 31 
state and local governments adopted relevant environmental measures before 
the federal government. 
The concept of the environmental transition is important in evaluat-
ing state regulatory policy as the transition occurs for different environ-
mental problems at different places at different times. Certain states will 
go through a period of perception for particular concerns at different pe-
riods, due to a wide range of factors, some of which are discussed below. 
When a state goes through the environmental transition for a particular con-
cern is important for evaluating the inºuence of federal policy on state regu-
latory choices. Where a state’s environmental transition precedes federal 
regulation, the effect of federal action on state policy choices may well be 
different than when a state goes through the transition after federal regu-
lations are already in place.32 
B. Determinants of State Regulation 
The rate at which different states adopted environmental protections 
varied greatly.33 Some went through their environmental transitions with 
regard to particular environmental concerns well before others. Some of 
this pattern of state and local activity may be explained by the increase in 
economic prosperity and a resulting increase in the demand for environ-
mental protection. As already noted, it is generally accepted that as peo-
ple become wealthier, their willingness to pay for environmental protec-
tion increases, resulting in an eventual decline in at least some measures 
of pollution.34 Yet wealth and per capita income are not sufªcient in them-
selves to explain the patterns of state regulation. The variation in state 
environmental priorities is greater than differences in economic factors alone 
would indicate. Therefore, numerous other factors must also play a role. 
As a state’s population grows, many environmental impacts will in-
crease. The pressure to develop previously undeveloped land will rise; there 
will be more vehicles on the road; demand for energy production will in-
crease, and so on. Therefore, population growth (and other measures of de-
velopment) could well correlate with a demand for increased environmental 
protection.35 The amount of land available for development or environmental 
 
                                                                                                                             
32
 In addition, as discussed infra Part III, the adoption of federal regulations may them-
selves inºuence when a state goes through the environmental transition for a given envi-
ronmental concern. 
33
 See Johnston, supra note 18, at 494–95 (“for most of American history, American 
states and regions have exhibited tremendous variation in both their current economic de-
velopment opportunities and the extent to which prior development has transformed their 
natural environments.”). 
34
 See supra notes 26, 27, 28 and accompanying text. 
35
 This increase in the demand for environmental protection should also be driven, in 
part, by the increased marginal value of undeveloped land or resources as the supply dwin-
dles. For example, holding all else equal, the marginal value of each acre of undeveloped 
land in a sparsely populated and largely undeveloped state should be less than the value of 
an acre in a highly developed state. 
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preservation should have a signiªcant impact on the demand for at least 
some sorts of environmental protection. 
The economic and ecological beneªts provided by various environ-
mental resources—“the wealth of nature”—could also contribute to the de-
mand for environmental protection, whether or not they are priced and 
incorporated into economic markets. Wetlands, for example, provide many 
ecosystem services, including water ªltration, species habitat and ºood 
control.36 To the extent that these services have value in a state’s econ-
omy, the state government should be more likely to protect wetlands so 
as to maintain that value. Thus, for example, there may be greater support 
for coastal protections in a state with industries that rely upon coastal re-
sources, such as ªshing or tourism.37 In a similar fashion, states that re-
ceive substantial revenue from hunting and ªshing licenses, bird-watching, 
and the sale of outdoor recreation-related goods and services may support 
greater land and habitat conservation measures, at least insofar as the 
beneªts of such measures can be captured within the state. 
In one sense, efforts to protect a state’s “wealth of nature” will be 
due to local knowledge about the beneªts of local environmental ameni-
ties. Environmental knowledge, like economic knowledge, is highly de-
centralized.38 Speciªc knowledge about local ecological conditions—threats, 
problems, and solutions—is more likely to be found at the local level than in 
a centralized regulatory bureaucracy.39 Due to the decentralized nature of 
knowledge, one might expect that environmental protections would be 
adopted ªrst in those areas where local knowledge about the need for 
such protection is the greatest. A state in which there is substantial knowl-
edge about the ecological beneªts of wetlands—and the costs and extent 
of wetland losses—may be more likely to regulate than a state in which 
such knowledge is relatively lacking. This knowledge could be measured 
by economic data that measure the value of wetlands to a state’s economy. 
 
                                                                                                                             
36
 See generally Ofªce of Tech. Assessment, Wetlands: Their Use and Regula-
tion 37–60 (1984).  
37
 Likewise, a state in which coastal tourism industries predominate is likely to have 
different priorities within the realm of coastal protection than a state in which ªshing or 
other coastal-related industries are more dominant. 
38
 See, e.g., John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 Md. 
L. Rev. 1183, 1218 (1995) (noting that “[t]he knowledge necessary to administer any air 
pollution control program . . . can be found only at the local level.”). This observation is 
based on the insights of Nobel Laureate economist F. A. Hayek, who observed “[t]he 
knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated 
or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradic-
tory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess.” F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowl-
edge in Society, 35 Am. Econ. Rev. 519, 519 (1945). For more on the “knowledge prob-
lem” in environmental policy, see Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10, at 165–
66.  
39
 Butler & Macey, supra note 5, at 27 (“Federal regulators never have been and 
never will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information necessary 
to make optimal regulatory judgments that reºect the technical requirements of particular 
locations and pollution sources.”). 
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Such a state may also be more likely to regulate than the national gov-
ernment. 
Even apart from wealth and economic effects, environmental causes 
are clearly more popular in some states than in others. For whatever rea-
son, the political culture of some states is more hospitable to the adoption 
of environmental regulations than others. While this may correlate with 
other variables, such as income, wealth, education and the like, there is 
evidence that state environmental policies are in part a function of the 
environmental attitudes of state residents.40 
State environmental policy preferences can be measured in various 
ways. For instance, the League of Conservation Voters (“LCV”), a promi-
nent national environmental organization, publishes an annual vote rating 
for members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. 
LCV ratings appear to correlate with political preference for environmental 
regulatory policies.41 These ratings vary from state to state and do not 
appear to be explained solely by economic factors.42 Another measure of 
state support for environmental measures more generally could be mem-
bership or contributions to state-level environmental organizations.43 
There are several other independent political variables that could inºu-
ence the likelihood that a given state will adopt environmentally protec-
tive measures. Some state governments may be more “activist” or “pro-
fessional” than others. It is possible that states with larger state govern-
ments, measured by budget or personnel, would be more likely to adopt 
environmental regulations than states with smaller, less active governments. 
Among other things, this could reºect the political culture of the state, as 
 
                                                                                                                             
40
 See Teske, supra note 9, at 169 (citing Matthew Potosky, Clean Air Federalism: Do 
States Race to the Bottom?, 61 Pub. Admin. Rev. 335 (2001)). 
41
 See Teske, supra note 9, at 191. 
42
 See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in Environmental 
Law, in The Jurisdynamics of Environmental Protection: Change and the Prag-
matic Voice in Environmental Law 369, 374–81 (Jim Chen ed., 2003). There are some 
potential problems with the use of LCV vote ratings to measure the environmental nature 
of a given state’s politics. First, some would argue that the LCV vote ratings are politi-
cized, if not somewhat partisan. In this critique, the LCV vote ratings do not measure 
whether a given politician is “pro-environment” so much as whether he or she votes in line 
with Washington, D.C.-based environmental organizations and that such organizations 
have institutional or political interests which may conºict with some environmental goals. 
Insofar as such groups do not maintain a monopoly on what policy positions are pro-
environment, a politician could receive a lower vote rating despite his or her attentiveness 
to environmental concerns. At the same time, because environmental issues may differ at 
the state and federal level, a pro-environment vote rating in Congress may not correlate 
with attentiveness to environmental concerns in a given state. It may be that in a given state, 
environmental issues addressed by state and local governments are more important to vot-
ers than environmental issues typically addressed by the federal government, or vice versa. 
It is not altogether clear that state concern for local environmental problems would neces-
sarily translate into support for politicians that are supportive of measures to address na-
tional, or even international, environmental problems. Nonetheless, LCV ratings are almost 
certainly measuring a factor that inºuences state regulatory choices, even if only the politi-
cal inºuence of mainstream environmental interest groups. 
43
 See Teske, supra note 9, at 186. 
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some states will be more receptive to government regulation of any sort 
than others. In the political science literature, measures of the “profes-
sionalism” of state governments often correlate with their willingness to 
adopt regulatory measures.44 Some states may also be more ideologically 
predisposed to support the creation of regulatory programs. Therefore, 
whichever party controls the statehouse or various policy positions could 
also affect (or at least correlate with) state regulatory policy choices.45 
State regulatory choices are also inºuenced by the actions of other 
states. The “race to the bottom” theory posits that states will be discour-
aged from adopting the optimal level of environmental protections due to 
interjurisdictional competition with other states.46 The theory asserts that 
states seeking to encourage economic investment and industrial development 
will be locked into a “race” to lower existing environmental standards (or 
fail to adopt optimal measures) in an effort to attract investment. Further-
more, the theory states that any resulting economic gains will fail to off-
set the welfare losses from suboptimally lax environmental regulations.47 
Though possible, empirical evidence demonstrating a race to the bottom 
in environmental policy is generally lacking.48 There is evidence that state 
policy-makers consider the impact of environmental regulations on their 
states’ economic competitiveness.49 Nonetheless, most empirical studies 
have failed to ªnd any evidence that such pressures result in a systematic 
lowering of state-level environmental measures.50 
Whether or not there is a “race to the bottom” in environmental pol-
icy, the existence of interjurisdictional spillovers may discourage states 
from adopting some environmental protections.51 Where states are able to 
extraterritorialize the environmental effects of their own industrial growth, 
 
                                                                                                                             
44
 See id. at 187–88; Chris Mooney, Measuring U.S. State Legislative Professionalism: 
An Evaluation of Five Indices, 26 St. & Loc. Gov’t Rev. 70 (1994).  
45
 See Teske, supra note 9, at 180–81 (ªnding correlation between party control of leg-
islature and state regulatory activity). 
46
 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacriªce?: Problems of Federalism in Mandat-
ing State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 Yale L.J. 1196, 1211–12 
(1977); see also Recthschaffen & Markell, supra note 8; Fischel, supra note 8, at 162. 
47
 See Rechtschaffen & Markell, supra note 8; see also Engel, supra note 6; 
Swire, supra note 6. 
48
 See, e.g., Revesz, Rehabilitating, supra note 5; see also Adler, Jurisdictional Mis-
match, supra note 10, at 151–54. 
49
 Engel, supra note 6. 
50
 Several economic studies have failed to ªnd empirical evidence of any race to the 
bottom in environmental policy. See, e.g., Daniel L. Millimet & John A. List, A Natural 
Experiment on the ‘Race to the Bottom’ Hypothesis: Testing for Stochastic Dominance in 
Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 Oxford Bull. Econ. & Stat. 395 (2003); Daniel L. Mil-
limet, Assessing the Empirical Impact of Environmental Federalism, 43 J. Regional Sci. 
711 (2003); John A. List & Shelby Gerking, Regulatory Federalism and Environmental 
Protection in the United States, 40 J. Regional Sci. 453 (2000); see also Oates, supra 
note 5, at 11–17. See also Johnston, supra note 18, at 517 (noting conditions that could 
produce strategic over-preservation of natural resources by local jurisdictions). 
51
 See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 Duke L.J. 
931, 968–70 (1997); see also Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10, at 162–63. 
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they will be less likely to adopt environmental controls. For example, an 
upwind state may adopt air pollution control measures to protect its own 
citizens—who vote and pay taxes within the state—but is highly unlikely 
to adopt environmental measures designed to protect citizens of down-
wind jurisdictions. At the same time, downwind jurisdictions may be less 
likely to adopt environmental measures if such measures will be relatively 
unable to control environmental problems that are largely due to activi-
ties in upwind jurisdictions. 
States can also be encouraged to adopt greater levels of environ-
mental protection by the actions of their neighbors. Insofar as one state is 
successful at addressing a given environmental problem in a cost-effective 
manner, other states become more likely to follow suit as they learn from 
competing jurisdictions. This hypothesis has some empirical support in 
studies showing that state decisions to adopt speciªc regulatory measures 
are inºuenced by the decision of neighboring jurisdictions to adopt simi-
lar measures.52 These studies ªnd stronger evidence for this positive 
“contagion” effect than for a negative “race to the bottom.”53 
Just as state policy-makers can be inºuenced by policy decisions and 
environmental conditions in other states, state policy-makers can be inºu-
enced by the federal government. Federal regulatory decisions undoubt-
edly affect state environmental policy choices. At the extreme, some 
commentators suggest that state regulatory choices are heavily inºuenced, if 
not effectively dictated by, federal policy.54 Short of this, it is possible 
that the federal government still exercises a substantial inºuence on state 
regulatory decision-making, intentionally or not. For instance, while some 
federal policies directly seek to inºuence or preclude certain state poli-
cies, others may inºuence the relative costs and beneªts of implementing 
state policies, thereby encouraging or discouraging state regulatory ac-
tion. Unlike many of the other factors driving environmental policy deci-
sions at the state level, these effects have been relatively unexplored.55 
 
                                                                                                                             
52
 See Oates, supra note 5, at 15 (“States appear to be ‘pulled’ to higher levels of 
abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighboring states, but relatively lax 
regulations nearby appear to have no effect on such expenditures.”); Teske, supra note 9, 
at 180–81 (ªnding states are more likely to increase, rather than decrease, air quality regu-
lation in response to actions taken in neighboring states, and concluding that “the race to 
the bottom is not a factor here”); id. at 191–92 (also ªnding no “race to the bottom” in 
groundwater regulation). 
53
 Teske, supra note 9, at 180–81. 
54
 See, e.g., Dwyer, supra note 4, at 203 (“For the most part, states are not genuinely 
autonomous regulators; they exercise regulatory authority only by congressional grace.”). 
55
 One exception is Johnston, supra note 18, which considers the consequences of past 
and future centralization on state natural resource policy decisions. 
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II. Direct Federal Inºuence on State Policy Choices 
Federal policy decisions can have both direct and indirect effects on 
state regulatory choices. Their effects may also be either positive or nega-
tive, in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The potential of both positive 
and negative effects weakens the common presumption that adopting federal 
environmental measures will increase social welfare. It is possible that in 
some states the aggregate level of environmental protection could be lower 
than it would otherwise be due to the existence of federal regulations that 
discourage state environmental protection measures.56 
The most direct way for the federal government to inºuence state 
environmental policy decisions would be to dictate state policies from Wash-
ington, D.C. While this approach was considered by the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”),57 and mulled over by academics,58 it 
is clearly unconstitutional under current Supreme Court precedent. State 
governments remain “sovereign” under the doctrine of “dual sovereignty,”59 
and therefore cannot be commandeered by the federal government. Whether 
to ensure sufªcient disposal capacity for low-level radioactive waste60 or 
remedy lead contamination in drinking water,61 the federal government 
cannot require state governments to adopt desired policy measures. Ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in clear and unequivocal terms, this anti-
commandeering principle admits no exceptions.62 
 
                                                                                                                             
56
 It is also possible that while the aggregate level of environmental protection could 
increase, social welfare might decline because the costs of the increased levels of environ-
mental protection are greater than the beneªts. 
57
 See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); 
Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 
99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 (D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. 
EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977). This litigation is summarized in Adler, Judicial Feder-
alism, supra note 10, at 423. 
58
 See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 46. 
59
 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991). 
60
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that portions of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments unconstitutionally commandeer state 
governments). 
61
 Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now (ACORN) v. Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 
1996) (invalidating portions of the Lead Contamination Control Act). 
62
 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (“[N]o case-by-case weighing 
of the burdens or beneªts is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible 
with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.”). There is language in Printz that sug-
gests purely ministerial requirements might be exempt from the anti-commandeering rule, 
but the federal courts have not, as yet, found an attempted commandeering that was sufªcient-
ly immaterial to warrant an exception. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 936 (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring) (noting the Court “appropriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministe-
rial reporting requirements” represent unconstitutional commandeering of state govern-
ments). This may be due, in part, to the fact that relatively few statutes, environmental or 
otherwise, commandeer state governments. Two exceptions, the Forest Resources Conser-
vation and Shortage Relief Act and a provision of the Lead Contamination Control Act, 
were invalidated by lower courts on commandeering grounds. See Bd. of Natural Res. v. 
Brown, 992 F.2d 937 (9th Cir. 1993); ACORN, 81 F.3d 1387. A few such statutes in the 
environmental context remain, but these statutes have not been challenged in court. Two 
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Despite the prohibition on federal commandeering of state govern-
ments, the federal government retains substantial ability to inºuence state 
policy-making. The powers enumerated in Article I of the Constitution 
provide abundant means of encouraging state and local governments to 
act in accordance with federal preferences. If the federal government seeks 
to prevent states from regulating in a given ªeld, it may preclude states 
from acting. Such preemption should, in principle, be authorized by Con-
gress, though federal agency actions can also have preclusive effect. Un-
der the Supremacy Clause, the federal government has the largely un-
challenged authority to preempt contrary state laws through the exercise 
of Congress’s enumerated powers. Preemption is used to reduce the amount 
of state regulatory activity.63 
If the federal government seeks to encourage greater regulatory ac-
tivity by state governments, it may offer various inducements. These in-
ducements may be positive (carrots) or negative (sticks). The most straight-
forward way to encourage state activity is to offer ªnancial support for 
state programs that meet federal requirements or to otherwise confer bene-
ªts on compliant state governments. Occasionally more punitive measures 
may be required, such as the threat to preempt regulatory activity by non-
compliant states or reduce funding from unrelated programs. In practice, 
the federal government often resorts to some combination of measures to 
encourage the desired level of state regulation. The ways in which federal 
policy may inºuence state regulatory decisions directly are illustrated in 
Figure 1a and discussed in greater detail below. 
 
                                                                                                                             
examples are mandatory reporting requirements contained in the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001(a)-(c), 11003(e), 11022(a), 
11022(e)(3) (2000), and the underground storage tank provisions of the Resource Conser-
vation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6991a(c) (2000). As these statutes impose 
minimal requirements on state governments, and the relevant programs are already in place, it 
is unlikely that these statutes will be challenged in the future. See Adler, Judicial Federal-
ism, supra note 10, at 423–30. 
Where federal courts have excused commandeering of state agencies in the environ-
mental context, it has been by denying that commandeering is taking place. The court’s order 
in Strahan v. Coxe arguably commandeered state ofªcials under the federal Endangered 
Species Act, yet the First Circuit denied this was the case. See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 
155 (1st Cir. 1997); Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 429–30. 
63
 “Regulatory activity” here should be understood to include legislation and agency 
regulations, as well as judicial decrees that have a forward-looking regulatory effect, in-
cluding tort judgments that create de facto standards for product safety or professional 
conduct. 
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Figure 1a: Federal Inºuence on State Regulatory Activity 
 Direct Indirect 
More State Regulation 
(“positive”) 
Commandeering 
Inducement 
 
Less State Regulation 
(“negative”) 
Preemption  
A. Preemption 
Where Congress adopts a law pursuant to its enumerated powers, it 
preempts conºicting state laws. Federal preemption comes in two forms, 
express and implied. Express preemption is straightforward: where Con-
gress or a federal agency explicitly preempts state laws on a given sub-
ject, states are barred from adopting and enforcing their own regulations.64 
Yet Congress need not be so explicit for courts to ªnd preemption. Pre-
emption may be implied “where the scheme of federal regulation is ‘so 
persuasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no 
room for the states to supplement it,’”65 so-called “ªeld preemption.” Pre-
emption may also be implicit where state and federal law conºict or compli-
ance with state law would obstruct, if not preclude, compliance with fed-
eral law, so-called “conºict preemption.”66 
Although courts may ªnd federal preemption where Congress has 
not made its intent to preempt state law explicit, such judgments are not 
to be made lightly.67 Generally, there is a presumption against ªnding pre-
emption.68 Explicit statutory language easily overcomes this presumption, 
 
                                                                                                                             
64
 See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 
U.S. 190 (1983) (“It is well established that within Constitutional limits Congress may 
preempt state authority by so stating in express terms.”). 
65
 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting Fid. Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). 
66
 Id. 
67
 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Fed-
eralism Decisions, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 429 (2002); Michael S. Greve & Jonathan Klick, 
Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment, 14 Sup. Ct. 
Econ. Rev. 43 (2006). 
68
 See Wisc. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (“When considering 
pre-emption, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest pur-
pose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). 
Although this is the stated presumption, it is not clear how powerfully this presumption is 
applied in practice. See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225 (2000); Thomas W. 
Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, and Default 
Rules, available at http://federalismproject.org/preemption/papers/Merrill_Preemption_in_ 
Environmental_Law.pdf (on ªle with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). A revised 
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as does a clear conºict between state and federal law. If federal law is su-
preme, it will not yield to conºicting state enactments. In other cases, the 
presumption will be overcome where there are indicia of Congressional in-
tent suggesting that the federal government did not intend to allow state 
interference in a given area or ªeld. In such cases, and when preemption 
is inferred from federal agency action, Congressional intent is “the ulti-
mate touchstone” of preemption analysis.69 
Preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity. The net ef-
fect of federal preemption is often for there to be less regulation than there 
would have been otherwise.70 Federal laws precluding state regulation of 
automobile or oil tanker design mean that manufacturers need only com-
ply with one regulatory standard. Federal regulations in such cases serve as a 
regulatory “ºoor” and a regulatory “ceiling” at the same time. In other 
cases, preemption may serve to ensure that there is no regulation govern-
ing a particular subject matter, where federal law precludes states from 
adopting particular rules but the federal government does not adopt rules 
of its own.71 Where implied preemption is found, this will typically pre-
clude any state or local regulation whatsoever.72 Where Congress explic-
itly preempts state regulation, however, the scope of the preemption usu-
ally will be limited to the extent provided for in the statutory text.73 
Given that preemption operates to reduce aggregate regulatory bur-
dens, it should be no surprise that federal preemption of state environmental 
regulatory standards is often sought by business interests seeking to es-
tablish regulatory uniformity, a “ceiling” on regulatory stringency, or both.74 
 
                                                                                                                             
version of this article will be included in a forthcoming book from AEI Press, edited by 
Richard Epstein and Michael Greve. 
69
 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (quoting Retail Clerks v. Scher-
merhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)); see also CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 
658, 664 (1993) (Courts should “focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessar-
ily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.”). 
70
 See Teske, supra note 9, at 15 (noting federal preemption has often been “designed 
to facilitate greater total deregulation”). In some cases the purpose of federal preemption is 
to replace one type of regulation with another. This still results in less regulation than if 
the federal regulation was adopted in addition to the state regulation. The effects of pre-
emption across states may not be uniform, however. A federal statute that imposes a fed-
eral standard when only a handful of states have regulated will increase regulation in some 
jurisdictions at the same time that it reduces regulation by preempting preexisting rules 
elsewhere. 
71
 The most obvious example, albeit a case of constitutional rather than statutory pre-
emption, occurs under the “dormant commerce clause.” States are precluded from adopting 
measures that discriminate against out-of-state trade not because it is assumed that such 
regulations will be adopted by Congress. Rather, there is a constitutional presumption against 
the adoption of such rules by any level of government, though Congress does retain the 
authority to adopt laws limiting the ºow of interstate commerce or even delegating author-
ity to the states to adopt such measures themselves. This division of authority “creates 
obstacles to states’ enacting laws that are more protective of the environment.” Richard J. 
Lazarus, The Making of Environmental Law 38 (2004). 
72
 See Weiland, supra note 11, at 258–59. 
73
 See supra note 68 and sources cited therein. 
74
 See Weiland, supra note 11, at 242 (“By creating a ceiling, environmental laws may 
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Federal preemption of state automotive emission regulations, for exam-
ple, resulted from lobbying by U.S. automakers fearing the potential for 
different emissions standards to be adopted in different states—and be-
lieving that federal standards would be less stringent than those devel-
oped in the states.75 This is not to say that there are not sometimes eco-
nomic justiªcations for preempting variable state standards with a single 
federal standard, only to note that this pressure for federalization often 
comes from industry rather than from environmentalist interests. 
The mere adoption of a federal regulatory standard that operates as a 
regulatory ºoor does not necessarily preempt state regulation as a legal 
matter (though it may well have that practical effect). For example, a 
federal regulation imposing emission limitations on an industrial facility 
will not necessarily preempt a less stringent or differently structured state 
regulation governing emissions from the same facility. As a practical matter, 
regulated facilities will focus on compliance with the more stringent fed-
eral standard and may ignore the duplicative state requirement (or vice-
versa). Nonetheless, the existence of the federal standard would not nec-
essarily absolve the regulated facility from simultaneous compliance with 
the state’s regulation, particularly insofar as the state regulation imposes 
independent reporting or enforcement provisions or uses an alternative 
means of determining compliance.76 There is no conºict as it is possible 
to comply with both rules; by meeting the more stringent regulation a 
facility would also comply with the less stringent regulation. If permits 
are required from both federal and state agencies for facility operation, then 
both permits are required even if compliance with one should make com-
pliance with the other a foregone conclusion, unless the less stringent stan-
dards are explicitly or otherwise preempted by the federal regulation.77 
 
                                                                                                                             
allow the private sector to operate within a predictable and uniform environment.”). For a 
recent example, see Am. Chemistry Council v. Dep’t of Transp., No. 90-345 (D.C. Cir. 
Oct. 13, 2006) (in which trade associations sued a federal agency seeking more expansive 
regulation of hazardous waste transportation so as to provide for greater preemption of 
local rules). Similar arguments have been used to support federal preemption of state regu-
lations and tort suits in other areas as well. See, e.g., Caroline E. Mayer, Rules Would Limit 
Lawsuits; U.S. Agencies Seek to Preempt States, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 2006 at D1 (pre-
emption by Consumer Product Safety Commission); Gary Young, FDA Strategy Would Pre-
empt Tort Suits, Nat’l L.J., Mar. 1, 2004, at 1 (preemption by Food & Drug Administra-
tion). 
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 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federaliza-
tion of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. Econ. & Org. 313, 330–33 (1985). For other examples 
of this phenomenon, see Environmental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 
(Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr., eds., 1992); Political Environmentalism: Go-
ing Behind the Green Curtain (Terry L. Anderson, ed. 2000). 
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differ. For example, it would be possible for the federal government to impose a technol-
ogy standard on a given facility while the state government could impose an explicit emis-
sion limit, or vice-versa.  
77
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2000) (preempting state enforcement of emission stan-
dards less stringent than existing federal standards). 
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Preemption is common in environmental law, particularly concern-
ing the regulation of products that are manufactured for sale in interstate 
commerce.78 For example, section 209(b) of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) 
prohibits states from adopting “any standard relating to the control of emis-
sions from new motor vehicles.”79 The Energy Policy Conservation Act 
preempts any state regulation of automotive fuel economy.80 Other pre-
emption provisions can be found in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act,81 and the Toxic Substances Control Act,82 among other 
statutes. In United States v. Locke, the Supreme Court found Washington 
State’s laws governing the prevention of spills from oil tankers to be pre-
empted by relevant federal laws.83 Federal environmental laws have also 
been found to preempt the federal common law of interstate nuisance.84 
B. Inducement 
Whereas the federal government has broad authority to preclude state 
regulation, its power to induce state regulation is more proscribed. State 
sovereignty precludes the federal government from dictating state regula-
tory initiatives. As noted above, such “commandeering” of legislative or 
executive functions violates the residual sovereignty of state governments 
and is not a “necessary and proper” exercise of federal power.85 This con-
stitutional prohibition hardly leaves the federal government without sub-
stantial ability to preempt state regulatory efforts, however. As the Su-
preme Court noted in New York v. United States, there are “a variety of 
methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress may urge a State 
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 Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 281, 306 (2003) (“[E]nvironmental regulation—in which both the states and 
the federal government play an active role—frequently raises preemption questions.”). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000). There are exceptions to this rule. EPA may waive pre-
emption of emission standards adopted by California, subject to certain conditions. 42 
U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000). Where EPA has approved a waiver for California, other states 
may adopt the California rule. In all cases, however, the other 49 states may not adopt a 
“third” standard. The CAA contains similar provisions governing standards for gasoline. 
42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4) (2000). 
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 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a) (2000). Unlike with emission standards, there is no conditional 
exemption for California. 
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 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000). There has been a signiªcant amount of litigation about 
the scope of preemption under this provision, in part because FIFRA also contains a sav-
ings clause at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a) (2000). See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, 
Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 89 
(2005). 
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 15 U.S.C. § 2617 (2000). 
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 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (ªnding preemption under the Port and Waterways Safety Act of 
1972). 
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 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). See also Robert Percival, 
The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance, 
55 Ala. L. Rev. 717 (2004). 
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 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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to adopt a legislative program consistent with federal interests.”86 Con-
gress can encourage “cooperative” regulatory efforts by offering states 
ªnancial and other resources to implement regulatory programs in con-
formity with federal requirements.87 Where such rewards are insufªcient, 
Congress may impose various penalties on noncompliant states, threaten-
ing to cut off funds unrelated to the regulatory program at issue or to pre-
empt state regulatory programs that do not meet federal dictates.88 
The federal government’s power to induce state cooperation is on 
display throughout the environmental portions of the U.S. Code. While 
current federal environmental laws grant expansive regulatory authority 
to federal agencies, most environmental statutes are implemented through 
a “cooperative federalism” model.89 The federal government outlines the 
contours of a given regulatory program, and then uses a combination of car-
rots and sticks to encourage states to implement the program in accor-
dance with federal regulations.90 The carrots include funding for state regu-
latory programs; the sticks include the threat of federal preemption—
speciªcally, if states refuse to regulate as the federal government demands, 
the federal government may regulate in their place—and, in some in-
stances, the loss of federal funding not directly related to the implemen-
tation of environmental regulations. Provided the relevant standards are 
met, states are free to tailor the details of their individual programs to ac-
commodate local conditions and concerns.91 
The strongest inducements for state cooperation are probably found 
in the CAA.92 Pursuant to the CAA, EPA establishes nationally applica-
ble air quality standards, known as the National Ambient Air Quality 
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 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992). 
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 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1256 (2000) (authorizing ªnancial support for state water pol-
lution control programs that conform with federal requirements); see also Percival, supra 
note 1, at 1173 (noting other examples). 
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 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2000) (detailing sanctions imposed on states for failing 
to meet federal air quality standards). 
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 New York, 505 U.S. at 167–68 (1992) (“[W]here Congress has the authority to regu-
late private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized Congress’ power to 
offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having 
state law pre-empted by federal regulation. . . . This arrangement . . . has been termed . . . 
‘a program of cooperative federalism.’ . . .” (internal citations omitted)). Statutes that em-
ploy the cooperative federalism model include the Clean Water Act, Occupational Safety 
and Health Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the Surface Mining Control 
and Reclamation Act. Id. 
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 See Dwyer, supra note 38, at 1184. See generally Denise Scheberle, Federalism 
and Environmental Policy: Trust and the Politics of Implementation (1997). 
91
 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 
Md. L. Rev. 1516, 1534 (1995) (“The essence of cooperative federalism is that states take 
primary responsibility for implementing federal standards, while retaining the freedom to 
apply their own, more stringent standards.”). A notable exception is the case of product 
standards. As a general matter, federal product standards, such as vehicle emission stan-
dards, tend to preempt more stringent state standards. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) 
(preemption of state automobile emission standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) (2000) 
(preemption of state fuel standards). 
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 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7661f (2000).  
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Standards (“NAAQS”), for criteria air pollutants, including ozone (“smog”) 
and particulate matter (“soot”). States are required to draft State Imple-
mentation Plans (“SIPs”) that will ensure that the NAAQS will be met 
throughout the state, and submit these plans to EPA for approval.93 The 
SIPs must include a number of speciªc pollution control measures man-
dated by the CAA. If a state fails to submit an adequate SIP by the ap-
propriate deadlines, it is subject to one or more federal sanctions, includ-
ing the loss of federal highway funds, increased offset requirements for 
new development, and the imposition of an EPA-enforced Federal Im-
plementation Plan (“FIP”).94 Furthermore, local transportation projects that 
do not conform to an EPA-approved SIP are ineligible for federal ªnancial 
assistance.95 
Federal inducement does not guarantee that states will adopt meas-
ures that satisfy federal policy-makers. It does, however, adjust the rela-
tive costs and beneªts (economic and otherwise) of regulatory choices. If 
states decide that the costs of following federal preferences are greater 
than the value of the incentives offered (or if the costs are greater than 
bearing the punitive sanction threatened), they may not follow federal 
wishes. Indeed, in the 1970s when EPA claimed the authority to comman-
deer state ofªcials directly, some of these ofªcials still balked.96 States 
retain the ability to reject federal requirements under the CAA, yet some 
would argue that this combination of inducements virtually assures state 
cooperation.97 
III. Indirect Federal Inºuence on State Policy Choices 
Federal policies that directly inºuence state regulatory decisions are 
only half of the picture. Just as federal action may encourage or discour-
age state regulatory action directly, federal action may indirectly, or even 
incidentally, encourage or discourage state regulatory action. Federal poli-
cies will facilitate greater state regulation where such actions reduce the 
costs of state implementation, such as by subsidizing necessary research, 
or where federal policies increase the demand for given regulatory poli-
cies at the state level so as to alter or “set” state policy agendas. Federal 
policies will discourage state regulatory action where they “signal” that 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2000). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (2000). The imposition of such sanctions is not solely, or even 
primarily, within EPA’s discretion, as individual citizens and activist groups may force EPA’s 
hands through citizen suits seeking to enforce the express requirements of the CAA and 
regulations promulgated pursuant to it. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2000). 
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 42 U.S.C. § 7506 (2000). 
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 See Stewart, supra note 46, at 1204 (“State and local ofªcials refused to enforce many 
of the [EPA]’s unpopular controls.”); see also supra note 57, and cases cited therein.  
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 This author has argued elsewhere that, while the CAA’s inducement scheme is effec-
tive, it also may be unconstitutional insofar as it exceeds the scope of permissible uses of 
conditional spending. See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 447–52. 
2007] Impact of Federal Action on State Environmental Regulation 89 
state regulatory action is excessive or unnecessary, or where they reduce 
the marginal beneªts of adopting state regulatory programs—beneªts 
either to the general welfare, those interest groups demanding state regu-
latory activity, or to the policy-makers responsible for adopting the rele-
vant policies.98 Such crowding out is most likely to occur where federal 
regulations serve as a substitute for state regulations, though there may be 
other factors that have a similar effect. Adding in these indirect inºuences—
facilitation, agenda setting, signaling, and crowding out—produces a more 
complete matrix of the ways in which federal policies inºuence state regula-
tory choices (see Figure 1b below). 
Figure 1b: Federal Inºuence on State Regulatory Activity 
 Direct Indirect 
More State 
Regulation 
(“positive”) 
Commandeering 
Inducement 
Agenda Setting 
Facilitation 
Less State Regulation 
(“negative”) 
Preemption 
Signaling 
Crowding Out 
A. Positive Indirect Effects 
Federal regulation and other policy measures may indirectly encour-
age or facilitate state environmental regulation. Without offering any di-
rect inducements, the federal government may encourage state policy-
makers to adopt environmental regulations that they would not otherwise 
enact by affecting the costs and beneªts of state regulatory measures, or 
by increasing the demand for given policies at the state level. 
1. Agenda Setting 
One way in which federal action may indirectly encourage greater 
state regulation is taking actions that affect the state-level policy agenda. 
Speciªcally, federal action may elevate the salience of particular issues to 
state policy-makers, thereby increasing the demand for regulation or other 
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 It should be noted that the hypotheses presented in this section are not dependent 
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of policy formation. See Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak, Choosing 
How to Regulate, 29 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 179, 214–23 (2005) (summarizing various 
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policy action in a given state.99 In this fashion, federal policy-makers may 
engage in “agenda setting” that inºuences state regulatory policy choices. 
Actions by all three branches can have an agenda setting effect. For 
example, a study by an executive agency or congressional committee may 
identify a particular health concern that may prompt local action to re-
duce the threat. National debate over a given issue, such as whether to create 
or reform a new entitlement, may prompt states to act where the federal 
government does not. Similarly, a judicial decision either requiring the 
federal government to act, or perhaps ªnding that the federal government 
lacks the power to address a given concern, may raise the proªle of a given 
issue and increase the demand for action at the state level. 
An area in which federal agenda setting can be observed is indoor air 
pollution. Indoor air pollution is a serious environmental problem. Indeed, 
by some accounts, indoor air pollution is a greater health concern than 
outdoor air pollution in all but the most heavily polluted cities.100 Yet in-
door air pollution is not the sort of problem particularly suited to federal 
regulation. Insofar as indoor air pollution is a function of building design 
and local conditions, and does not involve spillovers across property—let 
alone jurisdictional—boundaries, it is the sort of issue that state and local 
governments should be able to address.101 State and local governments 
are in a better position to address indoor air pollution through building 
codes, real estate transaction disclosure requirements, workplace expo-
sure regulations, and the like. Thus it should be no surprise that there are 
few federal regulations governing indoor air. 
However, this is not to say that the federal government is inactive in 
this area. EPA has programs to address indoor air pollution, but these pro-
grams are, for the most part, designed to increase awareness and under-
standing about indoor air concerns and do not include regulatory con-
trols.102 EPA puts out information, including scientiªc reports, about ra-
don levels, environmental tobacco smoke and other issues affecting in-
door air.103 These reports increase the salience of indoor air pollution for 
state and local policy-makers, and therefore may increase the demand for 
state and local regulatory measures. When EPA released a study claiming 
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 William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of Regulatory 
Gaps, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 55 (2003) (“[I]ncreased activity and publicity about an issue can 
over time change stakeholder perceptions and possibly preferences.”). 
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 See Goklany, supra note 22, at 43 (noting that “indoor air quality, particularly in 
the home, is a far better indicator of the impact of air pollution on public health” than is 
outdoor air quality). 
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 For a discussion of where federal intervention is, and is not, justiªed to address en-
vironmental concerns, see Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10, at 139–57. 
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 See EPA, Air—Indoor Air Quality, http://www.epa.gov/iaq (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) 
(on ªle with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
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the risks posed by secondhand smoke. See EPA, Indoor Air Quality—Smokefree Homes 
Program, http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/publications.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2006) (on 
ªle with the Harvard Environmental Law Review). 
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secondhand smoke is a carcinogen,104 it did not prompt federal regulation. 
Yet numerous local governments cited this study as a basis for local ordi-
nances controlling secondhand smoke.105 A more recent report by the U.S. 
Surgeon General106 appears to be having a similar effect.107 
A combination of federal action and inaction has also increased the 
salience of climate change as an environmental policy concern. Various fed-
eral agencies have sponsored research and published reports on the potential 
impact of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse 
gases on climate change.108 Such actions, combined with the efforts of inter-
national organizations and environmental NGOs, have increased the 
proªle of “global warming” as a policy issue. At the same time, the fed-
eral government has not adopted any regulatory policies to control emis-
sions of carbon dioxide and other gases linked to climate change. To the 
contrary, both Congress and the Executive have, at times, explicitly refused 
to adopt such measures.109 
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 Congress considered, and rejected, a proposal to control greenhouse gas emissions 
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This combination of enhancing climate change’s proªle on the pub-
lic policy agenda and failing to act created an opportunity for states. Over 
the past decade, numerous states have adopted measures to address cli-
mate change concerns.110 Although these measures are more aggressive 
than those adopted by the federal government, most of the state measures 
are exceedingly modest, and few involve direct regulatory controls.111 
California, however, has sought to adopt prescriptive regulatory controls. 
In July 2002, California adopted legislation requiring the California Air 
Resources Board to “develop and adopt regulations that achieve the maxi-
mum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse gas emissions 
from motor vehicles.”112 Even though the federal government has not sought 
to regulate greenhouse gases, federal actions—ranging from scientiªc re-
ports to explicit refusals to regulate—have almost certainly increased the 
demand for climate policies at the state level.113 
2. Facilitation 
A second way that federal action may indirectly encourage greater 
state environmental regulation is by reducing the costs of developing or 
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EPA, claiming the agency was nonetheless required to regulate greenhouse gases under the 
CAA. EPA, meanwhile, declared it had the authority to adopt such regulations, yet it did 
not take any steps to do so. Subsequently, under the Bush Administration, EPA revised its 
legal opinion, concluding that the CAA did not confer regulatory jurisdiction over green-
house gas emissions. The Bush Administration has opposed legislative proposals to regu-
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EPA, 413 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (2006). 
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implementing environmental regulation. Federally funded scientiªc re-
search, data collection, and information disclosure requirements may re-
duce the ªxed costs of developing, implementing, and enforcing state 
regulatory programs. 
While much of the information required for effective environmental 
protection is local in nature, much of the relevant scientiªc knowledge will 
apply nationwide.114 The weather conditions and topographical features 
that inºuence ozone formation will vary from place-to-place, but the un-
derlying chemical reactions will not. Thus, federal research into the rela-
tive effectiveness of controls on various ozone precursors can reduce the 
cost, and increase the effectiveness, of state-level air quality regulation. 
Were each state required to conduct its own environmental scientiªc re-
search, there could be duplication and inefªciency.115 In addition, there are 
likely to be scale economies in the resources and technical expertise re-
quired for some forms of scientiªc research that reinforce the potential 
for federal efforts to facilitate state-level regulation. 
Federal information reporting requirements may also facilitate state 
regulatory measures. Under the federal Toxics Release Inventory, for ex-
ample, industrial ªrms are required to collect and release information about 
the amount of toxic releases from each facility. The resulting reports pro-
vide voluminous information on the nature and extent of industrial chemical 
use and disposal, and provide ªgures that serve as a proxy for the extent 
of industrial pollution. This information undoubtedly serves to increase 
the demand for regulation of toxic releases. At the same time, requiring 
the collection and publication of this information may reduce the costs of 
adopting supplemental state regulatory measures. By requiring the crea-
tion, collection, and dissemination of extensive data about industrial fa-
cilities, federal law may be providing state policy-makers with some of 
the information necessary to craft state-level responses to the same con-
cerns. Moreover, insofar as state policy-makers can rely upon industry 
reports required under federal law, this may reduce the monitoring costs 
to ensure compliance with related state rules. Thus, even modest federal 
actions may facilitate signiªcant state-level interventions. 
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B. Negative Indirect Effects 
Just as federal action may indirectly encourage greater state regula-
tory activity, federal action may discourage state regulatory action. This 
can occur in at least two ways. First, the adoption of a federal regulatory 
standard may “signal” that more stringent state regulations are unneces-
sary. In effect, the federal standard may be seen as evidence that a given 
level of regulatory protection is sufªcient to safeguard relevant public inter-
ests, and more stringent measures are unnecessary. As a result, the adop-
tion of a federal regulation may induce state policy-makers to adopt compa-
rable state protections. In addition, the adoption of a federal regulation 
may crowd out state regulatory measures by reducing the net beneªts of 
additional state measures. As a result, the existence of federal regulation 
may discourage the adoption of additional state-level regulatory protections 
in the future. 
The potential for federal regulatory measures to reduce the level of 
state regulatory activity is signiªcant because it challenges the prevailing 
assumption that the adoption of a federal regulatory standard raises, or at 
least maintains, the aggregate level of protection nationwide.116 Many envi-
ronmental analysts, for example, suggest that the federal government should 
adopt a regulatory ºoor, but allow states to implement federal standards 
and adopt more stringent measures of their own.117 The general belief is 
that this will maximize the extent of environmental protection. Yet if the 
adoption of federal regulatory standards can induce states to adopt less pro-
tective environmental measures than they would otherwise have adopted, 
the net beneªts of a federal ºoor will be less than traditionally assumed, and 
in some states it will actually result in a net reduction in the aggregate 
level of environmental protection. Indeed, it is possible that the net result 
of a federal regulatory ºoor, over time, could be the maintenance of lower 
levels of environmental protection than would otherwise have been adopted. 
Even if such effects are unlikely, federal policy-makers should consider 
these possibilities when assessing the likely costs and beneªts of federal 
action. 
1. Signaling 
Just as federal attention to a given environmental concern may increase 
the demand for state-level action, the adoption of a given federal standard 
may send a signal that discourages the adoption or maintenance of more 
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 See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition as a 
Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2005) (noting 
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vitality” in environmental policy debates). 
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protective state regulations. Speciªcally, the adoption of a given regula-
tory standard by a federal agency sends a signal that the standard is worth-
while.118 Among other reasons for this effect is that federal policy-makers, 
particularly federal agencies, are presumed to have substantial technical 
expertise. Thus, their actions may convince state policy-makers (or their 
constituents) that additional safeguards are “unnecessary” or that the 
beneªts of more stringent regulatory protections are not worth their costs. 
The magnitude of this effect is likely to correspond with the magnitude 
of the difference between the relevant federal and state standards. In this 
way, federal standards can discourage state policy-makers from adopting 
and maintaining more stringent measures of their own, even where such 
measures could be justiªed. As a practical matter, the federal “ºoor” may 
become a “ceiling” as well. 
This effect is not merely hypothetical. There are numerous examples 
of state legislation designed to prevent state environmental agencies from 
adopting regulatory standards that are more stringent than federal rules.119 
Between 1987 and 1995, nearly twenty states adopted at least one statute 
limiting the ability of state agencies to adopt regulatory controls more 
stringent than relevant federal standards.120 Some states focus on a given 
environmental concern, while others have general prohibitions against the 
adoption of any environmental rules more stringent than applicable fed-
eral standards.121 New Mexico and Colorado, for example, have statutes 
prohibiting the promulgation of air pollution controls more stringent than 
those required by federal law.122 Virginia law bars state regulatory authorities 
from requiring greater amounts of water treatment than mandated under 
the federal Clean Water Act (“CWA”).123 Other states have general prohi-
bitions against agency promulgation of environmental rules more strin-
gent than federal law.124 
The existence of statutes barring state regulatory agencies from adopt-
ing more stringent regulations may be evidence of a greater hostility to 
environmental protection in some state legislatures than in Washington, 
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D.C. Yet such laws may also be a rational response to the signal created 
by the adoption of a federal standard at a given level, particularly insofar 
as state policy-makers conclude that their federal counterparts have greater 
expertise and understanding of relevant environmental concerns. Infor-
mation is costly, and the knowledge and expertise necessary to determine 
a given level of protection may tax the resources of state governments. 
Therefore, deferring to federal policy judgments by responding to the 
signal of a federal standard may enable state policy-makers to economize 
on information and policy development costs.125 
On the other hand, the localized nature of much environmental knowl-
edge and expertise could suggest that signaling may systematically en-
courage less optimal state-level regulation to the extent that federal stan-
dards fail to take local needs and variation into account.126 Some state 
laws may address this concern, however, as they allow state agencies to 
adopt more protective measures where local conditions warrant.127 
There are several reasons why this signaling effect may be of con-
cern. First, and perhaps most important, the existence of a signaling ef-
fect that reduces the level of state regulations below what they would other-
wise be could reduce the net beneªts provided by federal regulations. 
When the federal government adopts a federal regulatory standard, this will 
increase the level of regulation in states that have lower levels of regula-
tion. At the same time, it will lower the level of regulation in any state 
that adopts laws barring the promulgation of regulations more stringent 
than the federal standard. 
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Figure 2: Signaling Effect of Federal Regulatory Standard 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The net effect of such signaling is represented in Figure 2 above. States 
A and B have regulatory standards (QAReg and QBReg, respectively) less 
stringent than the federal standard (QFReg). State C, on the other hand, has 
a regulatory standard (QCReg) greater than the relevant federal standard. 
Adoption of the federal regulatory standard increases the aggregate level 
of regulation by a quantity equal to the sum of the difference between the 
federal standard and the lower state standards ((QFreg – QAReg) + (QFreg – 
QBReg)). The net effect of the federal standard may be lower than this, 
however. If State C adopts a law prohibiting state standards that exceed 
relevant federal requirements, the aggregate level of regulation will be 
reduced by the amount to which State C’s standard exceeded the federal 
standard (QCreg – QFReg). Thus, the net effect of the federal standard will be 
the extent to which the increase in regulation in States A and B exceeds 
the reduction in State C ((QFReg – QAReg) + (QFreg – QBReg) – (QCreg – QFReg)). 
In the unlikely event that the reduction in regulation in State C exceeds 
the increase in regulation in States A and B, the adoption of a federal 
standard could actually result in a net reduction in the aggregate level of 
regulation. 
There are other reasons to be concerned about a signaling effect. In-
sofar as federal standards are not based upon accurate, up-to-date scientiªc 
assessments of environmental problems,128 and such information is not 
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available to state and local policy-makers, the federal regulation may have 
an even greater distorting effect on state priorities. Such laws may also 
serve to shift effective control over environmental priorities from the state to 
the federal level.129 Of course, to the extent federal policy-makers are likely 
to adopt quantitatively or qualitatively superior regulatory standards, the 
signaling effect may have a positive effect on regulatory policy. Insofar 
as there are welfare beneªts from regulatory uniformity, there could be 
additional welfare beneªts to the extent a signaling effect reduces regula-
tory variability across states.130 
The importance of signaling is not that it necessarily results in less 
optimal regulation. Rather, the primary importance of the signaling effect 
is that it often reduces the net beneªt provided by the adoption of a fed-
eral regulatory standard. Taking this indirect effect of federal regulation 
on state regulatory choices into account will likely improve the quality of 
environmental policy-making. 
2. Crowding Out 
A second potential negative indirect effect of federal regulation on 
state regulatory choices is crowding out. This occurs because federal 
regulation may serve as a substitute for state-level regulation, thereby reduc-
ing the beneªts of adopting or maintaining state-level protections. Insofar 
as voters in a given state demand a certain level of environmental protec-
tion, there is no reason to expect states to duplicate federal efforts when a 
federal program satisªes that demand, particularly if a state has not al-
ready created such a program. If the federal ºoor is greater than or equal 
to the level of environmental protection demanded by a state’s residents, 
that state has no reason to adopt environmental regulations of its own once 
the federal government has acted. To the extent that this effect occurs, it 
is separate from—perhaps even in addition to—the signaling effect de-
scribed above. 
The claim here is not simply that states regulate less than they would 
absent federal regulation—although this claim is almost certainly true. 
Rather, the claim is that some states that would adopt regulations more 
protective than the federal ºoor, absent the imposition of federal regula-
tion, have not done so due to federal regulation and may not do so in the 
future. If this hypothesis is correct, the net effect of federal environmental 
regulation in at least some states could be less environmental protection 
than would have been adopted had the federal government not intervened. 
To see how this could occur, recall that the demand for environmental 
regulation in any given jurisdiction tends to increase over time as wealth, 
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technical capability, scientiªc knowledge, and environmental impacts 
increase.131 In any given state (as in the nation as a whole), there is an 
initial period (“Period A”) during which the demand for a given type of 
environmental protection is relatively low. The costs of adopting envi-
ronmental regulations in this period are greater than the beneªts of adopting 
any such protections. These costs include the costs of developing, draft-
ing, and passing legislation; the costs of creating a new policy program, 
drafting and implementing regulations, defending the regulations from 
any potential legal or administrative challenges, creating a means to monitor 
and enforce regulatory compliance; and so on. In addition, there are op-
portunity costs of devoting state resources and political capital to the 
cause of environmental protection as opposed to some other policy goal. 
As discussed earlier, the demand for environmental protection has 
tended to increase over time along with increases in living standards.132 
At the same time, increases in technical knowledge and administrative 
efªciency may lower the costs of a given regulatory program. Eventually, 
a state will enter a second period (“Period B”) in which the beneªts of a 
given environmental regulatory program are greater than the costs of ini-
tiating, implementing, and operating such a program. Absent any federal 
interference, the hypothetical state will not adopt environmental regula-
tions in Period A, but will adopt such regulations in Period B. See Figure 
3. This is the environmental transition discussed in Part I. In Period A, 
the demand for environmental protection is insufªcient to justify the 
costs of implementing environmental protection measures. By Period B, 
however, the demand for environmental protection has risen due to in-
creases in wealth and knowledge, among other factors. At the same time, 
increases in technical capacity and scientiªc understanding have reduced 
the cost of adopting environmental protections. As a result, in Period B a 
state will adopt QB amount of environmental protection.
133 
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Figure 3: Cost/Beneªt of Adopting Environmental Regulations 
Before and After the “Environmental Transition” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The timing of Period A and Period B will vary from state to state. 
This is clearly the case as different states have enacted different environ-
mental regulatory measures at different times—some before the adoption 
of federal environmental regulation, some after, and some not at all. Look-
ing at the history of various environmental concerns, such as air quality, 
water quality, or wetlands, it is clear that many states moved from Period 
A to Period B for these environmental concerns at various times prior to 
the onset of federal regulations in the 1970s. In many other states, how-
ever, a federal regulatory ºoor was adopted before the onset of Period B. 
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For states that went through their environmental transition and en-
tered Period B prior to the enactment of federal environmental protection, 
whether the adoption of a federal regulatory ºoor increased the aggregate 
level of environmental protection in that state depended upon whether pre-
existing state policies offered greater or lesser levels of protection than 
the relevant federal policies. For states in which the onset of Period B 
begins after the adoption of federal regulations, the enactment of a fed-
eral regulatory ºoor will, at the time of enactment, increase the aggregate 
level of environmental protection in that state. However, this may not be 
the case over time. In states that desire a greater level of protection than 
that provided by the relevant federal regulations, it is not clear that the 
existence of the federal regulatory ºoor will result in an equal or greater 
level of protection than would be adopted were it not for the federal regu-
lations. This is because federal regulation will, to some extent, act as a 
substitute for state regulation. As a result, the adoption of federal regula-
tion has the potential to reduce the demand for state regulation and, in 
some instances, even result in less aggregate regulation in a given state 
than would have been adopted absent federal intervention. In short, fed-
eral regulation can crowd out state regulation. 
The potential for such a crowding-out effect is illustrated in Figure 
4. The existence of federal regulation will reduce the demand for state 
regulation by an amount equal to the extent to which federal regulation is 
a substitute for state regulation of the same environmental concern (QFReg). 
This substitution effect will reduce the net beneªt of adopting state-level 
environmental regulations from OCQB to OC’Q’B. By reducing the net 
beneªts of state-level environmental regulation in this manner, federal 
regulation has the potential to crowd out state-level environmental pro-
tections, even if the quantity of environmental protection demanded in 
the state is greater than that provided by the federal government. In such 
cases, the aggregate level of environmental protection will be lower with 
federal regulation than it would be without it. 
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Figure 4: Effect of Federal Regulatory Standard on Net 
Beneªt of Adopting State-Level Environmental Regulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A key assumption in this analysis is that there are signiªcant ªxed 
costs to the adoption of environmental protections (or, for that matter, 
any regulatory program). In some states, the additional beneªts of adopt-
ing more stringent regulations on top of the federal requirements will 
more than offset the costs of adopting the new program. In these states 
the ªxed costs of creating a program plus the operating costs are less 
than the expected marginal beneªts from the additional margins of regu-
lation. However, it seems likely that there are at least some states in 
which the aggregate net beneªts of regulation at a level more protective 
than the federal standard are greater than the costs, but where the net 
beneªts of additional regulation above the federal ºoor are less than the 
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costs of adopting such additional regulations. In other words, if the net 
beneªts of adopting state regulations alone (OCQB) are greater than the 
costs of adopting such regulations (CReg), but the net beneªts of adopt-
ing such regulations given federal regulations are already in place 
(OC’Q’B) are less than CReg, then the presence of a federal regulatory ºoor 
will produce a lower level of environmental protection than were that ºoor 
not to exist.134 
In this latter situation, one would not expect the state to regulate, 
even though the amount of regulation demanded in the given state is greater 
than that provided by the federal government. While federal regulation cre-
ates a ºoor, raising the regulatory baseline, it does not reduce the ªxed 
costs of policy change. If anything, it may increase the opportunity costs 
for state policy-makers who devote their political capital to the environ-
mental resource at issue rather than another environmental concern in 
which the federal government is not active. Federal regulation does, how-
ever, reduce the beneªts of state regulation, and may do so signiªcantly, 
making state-level initiatives less attractive to state policy-makers. 
This theory is based on several premises and observations about the 
political economy of policy-making. First, environmental regulation, like 
most forms of regulation or other government action, experiences dimin-
ishing marginal beneªts and increasing marginal costs. That is, the mar-
ginal environmental gains from each additional increment of regulation 
will tend to be less than the gains from the preceding increment. Thus, when 
the federal government establishes a ºoor, it has likely displaced those 
state efforts that would be most cost-beneªcial. (This has the effect of shift-
ing the demand curve for state regulation to the left, reducing the net bene-
ªts of state regulation.) 
Second, the political process imposes substantial transaction costs 
on the creation (or elimination) of new government programs, and these 
costs are relatively ªxed such that they do not vary with the size of the 
program in question. The most obvious example of such transaction costs 
is the existence of so-called “vetogates”135 that determined minority inter-
ests can use to prevent the adoption of policies that enjoy majority sup-
port.136 The existence of these vetogates means that many policy changes 
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 Put in formulaic terms, for states in which OCQB > CReg but CReg > OC’Q’B, the 
presence of a federal regulatory ºoor will result in a lower level of environmental protec-
tion. 
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 William Eskridge deªnes a “vetogate” as “a place within a process where a statu-
tory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed.” William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Em-
piricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 671, 677 n.13 (1999). 
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 See McNollgast, supra note 118, at 11 (observing that because “attempts to pass 
new legislation typically must navigate through numerous veto gates . . . it is difªcult and 
time-consuming to change most prior legislative bargains”). While some states have differ-
ent legislative structures, and therefore may have a lesser (or greater) number of “veto-
gates,” the general observation that determined minority interests can block the adoption of 
policies that enjoy majority support still holds. 
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must have supermajority support before they are enacted—or at the very 
least require the expenditure of substantial amounts of political capital by 
their proponents (as a means of purchasing supermajority support).137 The 
fragmentation of policy-making authority across branches of government 
adds to the difªculty of adopting new policies. These obstacles may also 
be particularly large in highly complex policy areas like environmental 
protection.138 
Third, policy-makers are, to some extent, utility maximizers such that, 
all else equal, they will invest in policies that provide the greatest beneªts 
and lowest costs to them.139 Insofar as state policy-makers “share” responsi-
bility for some environmental concerns with their federal counterparts, it 
may be difªcult for them to secure the beneªts of their efforts.140 Relat-
edly, information about the relative activities of the federal and state gov-
ernments and their relative merits is costly to the average voter where 
both the state and federal governments are active. As a result, it may be 
difªcult for policy-makers to get credit for all of the policies they promote 
or implement.141 This is one reason why some argue that cooperative fed-
eralism undermines accountability. When both the federal government 
and the states are involved, it is more difªcult for a voter to know who to 
credit or blame for a given policy.142 Because it is easier for a state pol-
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 Id. at 16 (noting “the basic structure of government establishes several checks on 
the ability of legislative majorities to enact their will”). 
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 Lazarus, supra note 71, at 32 (noting the “strong structural bias within our exist-
ing lawmaking institutions in favor of government’s acting more slowly and incremen-
tally”). While Lazarus’ comments are directed at the national government, this same struc-
tural bias can be seen in state governments as well. 
139
 The utility maximized by the policy-maker need not be the policy-maker’s “self-
interest” but could also be the “public interest” that the policy-maker seeks to serve. See 
Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz & Robert N. Stavins, The Choice of Regulatory 
Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 333 (1998) (observing 
that a legislator may derive utility from many different interests). Alternate assumptions do 
not alter the analysis. Indeed, as Jonathan Macey observes,  
[O]ver a wide range of issues, the outcomes predicted by the public-interest model 
will be identical to those predicted by the interest-group model when the politi-
cal-support-maximizing solution varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of 
Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 Va. L. Rev. 265, 284 
(1990); see also supra note 98 and sources cited therein. 
140
 See Buzbee, supra note 99, at 27–28 (noting policy-makers may view “regulatory 
opportunity as a commons resource much as ªshers would view a shared ocean,” resulting 
in regulatory inattention). 
141
 See Macey, supra note 139, at 275 (noting the division of authority between federal 
and state governments can enable Congress to “shift the blame for controversial enact-
ments even more effectively . . . than by deferring to administrative agencies”); Buzbee, 
supra note 99, at 31 (“Where numerous regulators could be blamed for the ill, or sought 
out for relief, demanders of regulation encounter substantial informational and strategic hur-
dles confounding attribution decisions.”). 
142
 See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 Miss. L.J. 557 (2000–
01); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: 
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icy-maker to get credit for a policy when the state does not compete with 
the federal government in the provision of that policy goal, all else being 
equal, a state policy-maker will prefer to legislate where the federal gov-
ernment is less active. 
One implication of the crowding-out effect is that it is possible that 
the adoption of a federal regulatory ºoor may result in lower aggregate lev-
els of regulatory protection than had the federal government not entered 
the ªeld at all. This potential is illustrated in Figure 5 below. As in Fig-
ure 2, which illustrated the signaling effect, States A and B initially have 
regulatory standards (QAReg and QBReg, respectively) less stringent than the 
federal standard (QFReg), while State C has a regulatory standard (QCReg) 
greater than the relevant federal standard. Here, however, the demand for 
environmental regulation in each state is not static. Rather, the demand 
for regulation in State B is increasing over time as State B goes through 
its own environmental transition. Absent federal regulation, State B would 
eventually adopt a higher level of protection—a level of protection greater 
than that which would be adopted at the federal level. In this scenario, 
the adoption of a federal standard has the potential to signal to states to 
reduce their levels of protection. It may also discourage the adoption of 
even greater levels of protection in those states that go through their envi-
ronmental transition after the adoption of the federal standard. This po-
tential opportunity cost of federal regulation is no less important than the 
more observable effects illustrated in Figure 2. 
Figure 5: Crowding-Out Effect of Federal Regulatory Standard 
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When the crowding-out effect is combined with the signaling effect 
discussed above, the likelihood that federal regulation could result in a 
net decline in the aggregate level of regulatory protection increases. As 
before, adoption of the federal regulatory standard increases the aggregate 
level of regulation by a quantity equal to the sum of the difference between 
the federal standard and the lower state standards. The net beneªt of the 
federal standard at any given point in time is this amount (QFReg–QAReg), 
less any reduction due to signaling (QCReg–QFReg), and the extent to which 
State B would have regulated absent federal action (QBReg–QFReg). Here the 
net effect of the federal standard will be the extent to which the increase 
in regulation in State A varies from the reduction in State C and regula-
tion abandoned in State B. Stated as a formula, the net beneªts of federal 
regulation equal: (QFReg–QAReg) – [(QBReg–QFReg) + (QCReg–QFReg)]. 
Even if the adoption of federal regulation initially increased the ag-
gregate level of regulatory protection, over time the level of protection 
might be less than it would otherwise have been. As more states go through 
their environmental transitions, the magnitude of this crowding effect 
could increase, unless federal regulatory standards are able to keep pace. 
Given the slow rate at which existing federal regulatory programs are re-
viewed and expanded, however, this is a questionable assumption. 
IV. Qualitative vs. Quantitative Protection 
Up until this point, this Article has discussed environmental protec-
tion in a two-dimensional fashion, focusing on quantitative changes in regu-
latory protection. This vastly oversimpliªes the relevant analysis, as vari-
ous regulatory programs will vary in both quantitative and qualitative 
terms.143 Two programs that appear to adopt the same quantitative level of 
environmental protection, such as the same ambient standard or emission 
limit, may vary quite signiªcantly in cost, effectiveness, equitableness, 
and external effects on other media. Conversely, two programs that adopt 
superªcially disparate goals may, in fact, offer qualitatively similar envi-
ronmental protection. For these reasons, any complete analysis must ac-
knowledge that environmental measures vary in both qualitative and quanti-
tative ways. 
There are several factors that may cause state-level environmental 
regulations to be more cost-effective, or otherwise qualitatively superior, 
than federal regulations of equivalent cost or scope.144 First, and perhaps 
most important, state policy-makers and regulators may have access to 
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 See Keohane, Revesz & Stavins, supra note 139, at 313 (noting that the design of 
environmental policy requires determining both the desired level of environmental protec-
tion and what policy instruments should be used to achieve the speciªc environmental goal). 
144
 See Teske, supra note 9, at 23 (summarizing potential advantages of state regula-
tion). 
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knowledge of local problems and conditions.145 Consideration of such 
knowledge in the development and implementation of state regulatory pro-
grams may increase the protectiveness of existing programs without in-
creasing their cost or scope. Second, state policy-makers, because they 
are closer both to the environmental problems they seek to address and the 
regulated community, may be more responsive to local needs and con-
cerns. Third, insofar as environmental problems vary from place to place, 
state policy-makers may be able to focus state resources on environmental 
problems that exist in a given state. Federal standards, on the other hand, 
tend to impose broad one-size-ªts-all requirements that, in actuality, of-
ten ªt no state particularly well.146 A regulatory requirement that makes 
perfect sense in one state may not provide much environmental protec-
tion in another. Fourth, the existence of a federal standard may inhibit the 
ability of (or incentive for) state policy-makers to innovate or experiment 
with different approaches to meeting a given environmental goal.147 
There is empirical evidence that, at least in some areas, state regula-
tion may do a better job of addressing local environmental concerns in a 
cost-effective manner. Several states clean up abandoned hazardous waste 
sites at lower cost and more rapidly than the federal Superfund pro-
gram.148 Similarly, federal regulations may hinder the adoption of more ef-
fective pollution control or resource conservation strategies, and state 
policy-makers may be more sensitive to such concerns. The federal CAA 
requires many states to adopt suboptimal pollution control strategies when 
equally stringent—but differently targeted—measures would produce better 
results.149 In the wetlands context, states took the lead in evaluating wet-
land functions and incorporating the ecological value of particular wet-
lands into the regulatory process when there was no evidence that similar 
considerations entered the federal permitting process.150 In other words, 
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 See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text. 
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 See Dwyer, supra note 4, at 222 (“The sheer size of the nation and the dizzying va-
riety of social and environmental conditions and political preferences leave little hope that 
the central government could efªciently or accurately custom tailor environmental laws for 
different regions.”). See also Johnston, supra note 18, at 487 (“Regulatory centralization 
may be . . . just as tragic for natural resources as the regime of local control that it is de-
signed to replace.”). 
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 On state innovation generally, see Alexander Volokh et al., Nat’l Envtl. Pol-
icy Inst. & Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Race to the Top: The Innovative Face of 
State Environmental Management (1998). See also Revesz, supra note 25, at 636 
(“[T]he states, not the federal government, produced the most innovation in pollution con-
trol legislation in the 1990s.”). 
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 See Revesz, supra note 25, at 603 (noting state leadership in waste site clean up and 
brownªeld redevelopment); J. Winston Porter, Cleaning Up Superfund: The Case for State 
Environmental Leadership, Reason Foundation Policy Study No. 195 (1995), avail-
able at http://www.reason.org/ps195.pdf. 
149
 See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 462–63. 
150
 For instance, as of 1992 ten states were using wetland classiªcation systems to evaluate 
function and value in the regulatory process. William E. Taylor & Dennis Magee, Should All 
Wetlands Be Subject to the Same Regulation?, 7 Nat. Resources & Env’t 32, 34 (1992). 
The development of these sorts of programs is important because “[a]bsent regulatory 
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at a given level of stringency, some states were beginning to incorporate eco-
logical considerations so as to maximize the environmental value of regula-
tions on wetland development when the federal government was doing no 
such thing. 
States need not regulate “more” than the federal government to pro-
vide greater levels of environmental protection. Better regulation—that is, 
environmental protection measures that are qualitatively different—may 
be sufªcient in some instances to improve the level of environmental pro-
tection. Insofar as federal regulation encourages states to adopt a particu-
lar approach to environmental protection, or discourages states from adopt-
ing programs more suited to speciªc state conditions, it can reduce ag-
gregate environmental protection. Just as the federal government’s regu-
latory programs may discourage more extensive state regulatory efforts, 
these programs may also discourage the adoption of qualitatively prefer-
able state level programs that may differ more in kind than in their degree of 
stringency. 
Much of the discussion debating proper levels of federal control over 
environmental policy has also operated under the assumption that a greater 
quantity or stringency of regulation is necessarily more optimal. While this 
assumption is common in the environmental literature, it is also an over-
simpliªcation. Over-regulation, in the form of excessively stringent or 
overly enforced regulatory requirements, is just as theoretically possible 
as under-regulation. If the costs of a given regulatory measure exceed its 
beneªts, then its adoption does not increase aggregate welfare.151 The most 
welfare-enhancing regulatory regime is that which comes closest to the op-
timal level of environmental regulation, not necessarily that which produces 
the greatest level of regulation. 
V. Case Study: Wetlands 
The “cooperative federalism” model implemented in most federal envi-
ronmental programs complicates the observation of indirect effects due 
to the existence of inducement measures to encourage state regulation. 
Wetlands regulation may be one context in which the indirect effects of 
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spect to functional value, and that no distinctions are necessary in the level of regulation or 
in designating mitigation requirements.” Id. at 32. On the other hand, a review of Corps 
permitting decisions found no evidence such considerations entered into the regulatory 
process. See Michael J. Mortimer, Irregular Regulation Under Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act: Is the Congress or the Army Corps of Engineers to Blame?, 13 J. Envtl. L. & 
Litig. 445, 446 (1998). 
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 The costs and beneªts of a given measure need not be measured in monetary terms. 
Moreover, this claim is not dependent upon being able to quantify the costs and beneªts of 
a given regulatory measure. Whether a given measure increases social welfare is independ-
ent of the ability to measure effects on social welfare. In addition, a narrow cost-beneªt 
comparison may ignore distributional effects that are equally relevant in the formulation of 
sound policies. 
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federal regulation on state policy choices can be observed, however, and 
perhaps even empirically tested. Under Section 404 of the CWA, the fed-
eral government regulates the ªlling and modiªcation of wetlands di-
rectly.152 States receive little inducement to assume responsibility for ad-
ministering the Section 404 program in the federal government’s stead.153 
Wetland regulation is one area in which the state regulatory choices are 
largely free from direct federal inºuence.154 For this reason, it may be easier 
in the context of wetland regulation than in other areas to isolate and as-
sess the extent to which non-preemptive federal regulation is having the 
sorts of indirect effects on state regulatory decision-making discussed in 
Part III. 
Several states began to regulate the modiªcation of wetlands well be-
fore the federal government. Massachusetts in 1963 became the ªrst state 
to enact wetland regulations, with the adoption of a statute requiring a 
state-issued permit for the dredging or ªlling of coastal wetlands.155 This 
statute was based upon preexisting zoning requirements adopted by local 
governments in several coastal states.156 Two years later, the Massachu-
setts legislature extended the statute to cover inland wetlands as well.157 
Other states shortly followed suit, including Connecticut, Georgia, and 
Washington.158 By 1975, when federal regulation of wetlands began, 
every coastal state in the lower forty-eight states save Texas had adopted 
wetland regulations of some kind.159 
Congress enacted the CWA, originally known as the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act Amendments, in 1972. The CWA prohibits the “dis-
charge of any pollutant,” including rock, sand, or dredged material, into 
“navigable waters” of the United States without a federal permit.160 “Navi-
gable waters” are deªned as “waters of the United States,”161 which has been 
interpreted to include all navigable and nonnavigable waters, their tribu-
taries, and wetlands whose use could impact interstate commerce.162 Sec-
tion 404 authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits “for the 
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 Alexandra D. Dawson, Massachusetts’ Experience in Regulating Wetlands, in Wet-
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discharge of dredged or ªll material into the navigable waters,” subject to 
a veto by EPA.163 
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not initially interpret the CWA 
to require Section 404 permits for the ªlling of wetlands.164 Environmental 
groups disagreed with this interpretation and sued the Army Corps in federal 
court.165 The United States District Court for the District of Columbia re-
jected the Corps’ interpretation of the Act, holding that Congress, in passing 
the CWA, “asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation’s waters to the 
maximum extent permissible under the Commerce Clause of the Consti-
tution,” including wetlands and other non-navigable waters.166 While 
there seemed to be a substantial amount of state regulatory activity prior 
to the onset of federal wetland regulation, after the federal government 
began regulating wetlands in 1975, the rate at which non-regulating states 
adopted new wetland regulations appears to have slowed. States that had 
yet to adopt wetland protections by 1975 had yet to go through their envi-
ronmental transition with regard to wetlands. It is possible, however, that at 
least some of these states went through their transitions some time after 
1975. Were it not for the adoption of federal regulation, these states may 
have adopted wetland regulations in the intervening years. Such legisla-
tion could well have been discouraged or delayed—or crowded out—due 
to the presence of federal regulations. 
Notably, all fourteen states in the continental U.S. with more than ten 
percent of their land area in wetlands according to the National Wetland 
Inventory adopted wetland protection measures prior to 1975.167 As one 
review of state wetland regulations noted, “most of the states with the larg-
est wetland acreages have adopted wetland regulatory efforts for all or a 
portion of their wetlands.”168 Although the adoption of such measures can 
entail signiªcant costs, the states with the most wetlands clearly deter-
mined that the value of protecting wetlands was greater than the attendant 
costs of regulating them, interstate competitive pressures notwithstand-
ing. This pattern is the exact opposite of what some scholars had pre-
dicted.169 It is also signiªcant that those states that regulated before the 
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Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 168 (2001) (citing Corps’ 1974 regulation, 33 C.F.R. § 209.120(d)(1) 
(1974)). 
165
 Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975). EPA 
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federal government tend to have more extensive regulatory protections 
than do those states that acted later. 
A potential explanation for this history of state wetland regulation is 
that those states with the most wetlands were, by and large, the ªrst states to 
go through the environmental transition with regard to wetlands. Under 
this hypothesis, states with a large percentage of their land area in wet-
lands were the ªrst to recognize the tremendous ecological and economic 
beneªts that wetlands can provide, including ºood control, water ªltration, 
species habitat, and the like. As these states went through the environmental 
transition, the demand for wetland protection increased until the beneªts of 
adopting such measures was greater than the costs. 
Beginning in 1975, however, the presence of federal regulation re-
duced the value of state wetland regulations to the extent that federal regula-
tion served as a substitute for state measures. Because of the ªxed costs 
involved with the adoption of a new wetland regulatory program, the net 
effect would be greater than just the substitution effect, so that states that 
went through the environmental transition with regard to wetlands after 
1975 may not have adopted wetland regulations of their own, even if the 
state regulations would have been more protective than the federal rules. 
Where states did subsequently adopt wetland regulations, the regulations 
may have been adopted signiªcantly later than they would have been ab-
sent the federal rules, due to the crowding-out effect. 
The history of wetland regulations also provides evidence of how 
federal policy-making may encourage the adoption of environmental poli-
cies at the state level. While Massachusetts and some other states recog-
nized the value of protecting their wetland resources before the federal 
government did, many other states adopted their ªrst regulatory measures 
after the importance of wetland protection was recognized at the federal 
level. 
Federal consideration and eventual passage of the Coastal Zone Man-
agement Act (“CZMA”)170 may have inºuenced state policy-makers as 
well, particularly in coastal states. A national discussion on the impor-
tance of protecting coastal resources could have increased the salience of 
coastal zone protection at the state level. The protection of wetlands is 
one of the speciªc policy goals explicitly referenced in the Act.171 Pas-
sage of the CZMA may have further encouraged state-level protection of 
coastal wetlands insofar as the CZMA authorizes federal funding of state 
coastal zone programs.172 
Contemporary developments in wetland protection at the federal and 
state level may provide further insight into the effect federal regulatory 
decisions have on state environmental policies. In 2001, in Solid Waste 
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Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
(SWANCC),173 the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the CWA. Speciª-
cally, the Court held that the CWA does not confer federal regulatory 
jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters, including isolated wetlands.174 
Initial reactions to the SWANCC holding predicted substantial negative 
effects on wetland protection efforts nationwide.175 
While the initial response to the SWANCC decision was alarm, the 
actual effect of the decision became murky rather quickly.176 A Joint Memo-
randum issued by the Army Corps and EPA in January 2003 prohibited 
the assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over isolated waters based upon 
the presence of migratory birds alone, but did not provide much addi-
tional guidance.177 At the same time, the two agencies proposed to clarify 
the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA through a rulemak-
ing.178 This effort was soon abandoned due to extensive criticism from 
environmentalist organizations.179 In the meantime, federal implementa-
tion of the holding has been inconsistent.180 A study by the General Ac-
counting Ofªce found that Army Corps district ofªces’ jurisdictional de-
terminations varied signiªcantly after SWANCC.181 In the courts, a circuit 
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split soon developed on the scope of the holding.182 Most circuits adopted 
a fairly narrow reading of SWANCC, though the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fifth Circuit interpreted SWANCC to impose potentially signiªcant 
limits on federal regulatory authority under the CWA.183 This interpretive 
split led the Supreme Court to once again consider the scope of Clean Water 
Act jurisdiction in 2006 in Rapanos v. United States.184 It is too early to 
tell whether the Rapanos decision will resolve the current ambiguity. While 
Rapanos produced a discernible holding, the lack of a majority opinion 
makes conºicting judicial and administrative interpretations more likely, 
if not inevitable.185 
As state policy-makers are more likely to adopt new environmental 
measures where the net beneªts from such actions are greatest—and they 
are most likely to receive credit for their efforts—the narrow interpreta-
tion of SWANCC, as well as the continued uncertainty as to the scope of 
post-SWANCC federal regulatory authority, would have discouraged ad-
ditional state action.186 The beneªts of additional state regulation, and the 
extent to which state policy-makers will be able to take credit for protect-
ing isolated waters is uncertain, so the value of such measures will be 
discounted accordingly. It is also possible that the reluctance of states to 
adopt additional wetland protections reºects nothing more than a lack of 
demand for such protections in those states that have yet to adopt meas-
ures covering isolated wetlands. Nonetheless, shortly after SWANCC, many 
states considered, and some adopted, additional regulatory measures to 
ªll the gaps potentially left by the decision.187 Insofar as Rapanos and subse-
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quent federal rulemakings resolve the lingering ambiguity over the scope of 
federal jurisdiction over waters and wetlands, state responses will be 
probative. 
The history of wetlands regulation is far from conclusive. While it 
provides evidence that federal actions can both directly and indirectly 
encourage the adoption of state-level environmental measures, it does not 
prove that federal regulations have crowded out state wetland protections. 
One can only surmise the details of such a counterfactual scenario.188 The 
pattern of wetland regulation is nonetheless consistent with the crowd-
ing-out theory. This narrative suggests the need for empirical examina-
tion into the determinants of state wetland regulation that seeks to meas-
ure the extent to which any crowding effect can be observed. 
Conclusion 
Both the federal and state governments have an integral role to play 
in environmental protection. If each is to play an optimal role, however, 
there must be greater consideration of how the various levels of govern-
ment interact. In particular, there must be greater consideration of how 
federal regulatory decisions may enhance or undermine complementary 
efforts at the state level. 
Even where federal regulation is absolutely necessary, establishing 
the optimal level of environmental protection requires consideration of 
how such regulations will affect state-level policy-making. In some cases, 
the adoption of a federal regulatory ºoor will enhance state efforts; in 
other cases, it will not. Indeed, in some instances, increased federal envi-
ronmental efforts may produce less environmental protection. This ob-
servation is important because it challenges the prevailing assumption 
that the adoption of federal regulatory ºoors ensures higher levels of pro-
tection than would exist absent federal involvement. The precise extent of 
federal inºuence on state regulatory policy requires further empirical ex-
amination. In the meantime, greater attention to these inºuences could 
further facilitate the development of more effective and protective environ-
mental measures. 
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